



DOCUMENTING GENOCIDE:  
THE EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING OF  
PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE FOR ORGANS IN CHINA  
AND  
THE CAMPAIGN TO ERADICATE FALUN GONG  
FACTUAL FINDINGS & ANALYSIS REPORT

Documenting Genocide:  
The Extrajudicial Killing of  
Prisoners of Conscience for Organs in China  
and  
The Campaign to Eradicate Falun Gong  
  
Factual Findings & Analysis Report

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## About the China Organ Harvest Research Center

The China Organ Harvest Research Center (COHRC) is a U.S.-based non-governmental nonprofit organization that conducts and presents authoritative research on organ transplant abuse in China including the killing of prisoners of conscience for organs. COHRC researchers seek out and analyze evidence from a wide range of Chinese and overseas sources. In addition to publishing reports and providing consultation to government entities and non-government organizations, the Center has presented its research findings at ethical and medical conferences around the world. Before establishing this organization, the group's lead researchers had studied the Chinese organ transplantation system for over a decade and contributed to reports cited by CNN, BBC, PBS, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The New York Times*, *The Times of London*, and *Forbes*.

Killing for organs is a crime against humanity and a new form of state terrorism. COHRC believes it is our shared responsibility to raise awareness of these atrocities. We look forward to collaborating with other researchers, policymakers, organizations, corporations, journalists, and human rights advocates to help end this barbaric practice and safeguard human dignity.

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## About This Report

In 2006, allegations first came to light that Falun Gong adherents in detention facilities and hospitals throughout China were being killed on demand to source organs for transplant surgeries.<sup>1</sup> Since then, international researchers have investigated these allegations and published corroborating reports.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, the organ transplant industry in China has continued to grow at a rapid pace over the past decade, as has the harvesting of organs from illicit sources.

To determine the scale of the problem, the actual sources of organs used for transplantation and the extent of the purported transition from the use of prisoner organs to voluntary donations by China's organ transplant system, the China Organ Harvest Research Center (COHRC) analyzed hundreds of transplant hospitals across the country and evaluated the implementation of the donation system by tracking the number of donations by region as well as the timeline and evolving policies surrounding official organ sources. All this data was examined in conjunction with government and industry statements, policies, legislation, regulations, projects, funding, medical journals, archived hospital websites, and media reports in Chinese, English, and other languages. COHRC published a comprehensive report of its findings in July 2018 titled, "Transplant Abuse in China Continues Despite Claims of Reform."<sup>3</sup>

This 2019 statement of facts incorporates a summary of COHRC's comprehensive reports, recent developments in China's transplant system since June 2016, interviews with relatives of organ harvesting victims and other missing persons, as well as survivors who were detained and tortured in China for their religious beliefs but escaped organ harvesting. These first-hand testimonies, and other previously published interviews of Chinese hospital medical staff, are cited in this report and its appendices or are available on request.

Parts I-VI of this report cover the scale, on-demand nature, and sources of organs used in China's transplant system, the role of the Chinese government and its authorized agencies in directing and perpetuating unethical organ procurement practices, and the mass extrajudicial killing of prisoners of conscience for organs in the context of the Chinese regime's persecution of Falun Gong. Part VIII provides a legal analysis of whether the Chinese communist regime has committed genocide and/or crimes against humanity in its harvesting of organs from living prisoners of conscience and campaign to eradicate Falun Gong.

Falun Gong is neither the first nor the last group to be persecuted by the Chinese communist regime, but it is the only group that has been openly targeted for eradication. Ample evidence has been accumulated to allow for a detailed study with respect to the development, methods, and outcomes of the persecution. The scale, sophistication, cruelty and longevity of the campaign against Falun Gong make it one of the most hideous human rights disasters of the 21st century.

One of the key aspects of the campaign against Falun Gong is the program to “transform” Falun Gong practitioners by forcing them to renounce Falun Gong’s teachings, the universal values of “Truthfulness, Compassion and Forbearance.” More broadly, the Communist Party’s persecution of all faiths and human rights defenders deprives its people of the fundamental freedom of belief and denies them basic human rights. Those in China who are not directly targeted are compelled to participate in the persecution of others. As a consequence of the Party’s sophisticated disinformation campaigns, concealment, and political and economic coercion, many people outside of China have been pressured to cooperate with the regime or have remained silent. Many more in the international community are not yet aware of this crime or its severity, thus there has been insufficient action taken by the world to stop these atrocities.

COHRC provides these findings and analysis to help all people, especially policymakers, understand the nature, scale, severity, driving forces, and implications of China’s organ harvesting from prisoners of conscience as well as the persecution of Falun Gong and other faiths in China. This report is primarily intended to facilitate efforts to shape legislation, formulate policy and develop effective strategies and measures in response to these state-driven crimes, to support justice and ensure accountability.

Given the facts presented in this report, we must all make moral choices that will have far-reaching impact both now and in the future.

COHRC Research Team

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## I. Inclusion of Organ Transplantation in National Strategy

Since 2001, the Chinese government has prioritized the organ transplantation industry in its national development strategy<sup>4 5</sup> and continuously incorporated organ transplantation into its Five-Year Plans for multiple ministries. As such, the government has invested heavily in research, development, and personnel training in transplantation technology to meet the needs of this rapidly growing industry.

The Five-Year Plan of China is a series of social and economic development initiatives that are part of China's national plan for economic development shaped by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) through plenary sessions of the Central Committee and national congresses.<sup>6 7</sup> The goal of establishing organ transplantation regulations was set forth in the Tenth Five-Year Plan for the Ministry of Health in 2001.<sup>8</sup> In 2004, organ transplantation technology was added as a major research area and key technology in the Tenth Five-Year Plan for National Health, Science and Technology Development of the People's Republic of China<sup>9</sup> as well as in the Eleventh Five-Year National Key Technology Research and Development Program in 2008,<sup>10</sup> and once again in the Twelfth Five-Year National Key Technology Research and Development Program in 2011.<sup>11 12</sup>

A large number of organ transplantation projects have been developed with funding from major national programs established by the ministries of health, science and technology, and education, as well as from other sources within the central government. These programs include the 973 Program<sup>13</sup> (National Program on Key Basic Research Projects), the 863 Program<sup>14</sup> (National High Technology Research and Development Program), as well as major programs funded by the National Natural Science Foundation.<sup>15</sup> The military and local governments have also invested heavily in domestic medical institutions to facilitate basic research and development in organ transplantation and promote its industrialization.

Ministry-approved organ transplant centers at almost all prestigious university hospitals as well as military and civilian medical university hospitals receive significant funding from all levels of government and the military for new technology research and development, promotion of industrialization, and transplant personnel training.<sup>16</sup>

As a result, China's transplant centers have made breakthroughs in key organ transplantation capabilities and technologies which have allowed the industry to become the most prolific in the world in just a few years since 2000. These initiatives and developments took place before China piloted its first organ donation program in 2010.<sup>17</sup> China has leapt from "follower" to "leader" of worldwide transplantation technology in recent years.<sup>18</sup>

For example, an archived web page of the organ transplant department of the First Affiliated Hospital of Sun Yat-sen University from 2013 showed that this department was engaged in over 50 research projects under the 863 Program and the Twelfth Five-Year National Key Technology Research and Development Program, as well as a project under the National Natural Science Foundation during the three previous years.<sup>19</sup>

As of April 2018, He Xiaoshun, the academic leader of the transplant center, had presided over 30 research projects with total funding of more than 40 million RMB.<sup>20</sup> From 1996 to 1998, he received only 80,000 RMB in funding despite having worked in this field for over ten years. In the seven years from 2001 to 2008, he received research funding of 850,000 RMB, a 10-fold increase. From

2008 to 2015, his team obtained research project grants totaling 12 million RMB, a 14-fold increase in 7 years.<sup>21</sup> He's team has also secured 33 million RMB in research funding for the period between 2016 and 2020, which is almost triple the funding for the 7 years between 2008 and 2015.<sup>22</sup> This investment has enabled He's team to focus on key technology research and make breakthroughs in the areas of non-ischemic and multivisceral transplantation.<sup>23</sup>

In celebration of its 100th anniversary in October of 2010, the First Affiliated Hospital of Sun Yat-sen University stated that “tens of thousands of patients have received liver or kidney transplants” there.<sup>24</sup> The amount and trend of research funding at this one hospital also provides a lens through which we can sense the enormity of investment by the Chinese government in the development of its organ transplant industry.

## II. On-Demand Nature of Transplants Performed in China

Organ transplant operations in China are usually conducted on demand with short wait times; they are scheduled in advance and use organs taken from living sources. While organ transplants around the world are conducted only as donors become available, in China, organs, including vital organs, can be made available as needed.

### 1. Transplants Scheduled Ahead of Time

Transplant surgeries in China are mostly scheduled ahead of time, as seen in individual and institutional accounts reflected in hospital profiles, media reports, and other sources. These include many cases of pre-scheduled transplants provided to foreign patients.

In November 2016, Australian Senator Derryn Hinch told Parliament that he was encouraged to travel to China for an organ transplant after he was informed that he had only 12 months to live, “I was told by a senior businessman in Melbourne that I could go to Shanghai and for \$150,000 get a new liver next week. I presume from that they would almost execute on order. Some well-known people have bought organs for transplant over the years.”<sup>25 26</sup>

Another case was that of an Israeli patient who traveled to China in 2005 for a heart transplant scheduled two weeks ahead of time.<sup>27 28</sup> In November 2008, a Spaniard named Oscar Garay traveled to Tianjin First Central Hospital in China to receive a new liver; he paid 130,000 euros and received the transplant that was scheduled in advance.<sup>29</sup> In early 2016, Malaysian politician Datuk Bung Moktar Radin traveled to China to receive a kidney transplant.<sup>30</sup> In August 2016, a Canadian patient received a kidney transplant after waiting for only three days during his trip to China.<sup>31</sup> These cases, as well as an on-site investigation by Korean journalists in the fall of 2017, suggest that the Chinese transplant system can guarantee not only a donor's death but also the time of his/her death. (See [Evidence 1: Pre-Scheduled Surgeries](#)<sup>32</sup>)

In addition to pre-scheduled surgeries, many individual and institutional accounts in hospital profiles, media reports, and other sources show individual departments conducting multiple transplants simultaneously with more than 10 or even 20 kidney transplants within 24-hour periods. One hospital transplant department conducted 5 liver transplants and 6 kidney transplants simultaneously and another carried out 4 heart transplants simultaneously in one afternoon.<sup>33</sup>

Doctors can procure multiple organs for a patient in quick succession in case a spare is needed due to mismatch or rejection. It is not uncommon for a patient to receive multiple transplants of the same organ that have come from different donors.<sup>34</sup>

One hospital claimed to have “donors seeking matched recipients” and guaranteed on its website, “[we] will continue to perform transplants until one is successful and will not charge for the repeat surgeries in case of failure.”<sup>35</sup> (See [Evidence 2: On-Demand Transplants](#)<sup>36</sup>)

All such procedures would have required not only advance planning but also a nationwide infrastructure of organ procurement networks.

## 2. Organs Taken from Living Sources

A core ethical principle in transplantation of vital organs is the “dead donor rule,” which stipulates that organ donors must be dead prior to procurement and that the procurement itself must not cause the death of the donor. However, evidence shows that some organs were excised in China from living people who were then killed in the process. (See [Evidence 3: Living Organ Sources](#)<sup>37</sup>)

The China International Transplantation Network Assistance Center (CITNAC) stated on its website between 2004<sup>38</sup> and 2007,<sup>39</sup> “In China, we carry out living donor kidney transplants. It is completely different from the cadaveric kidney transplants you hear about in Japanese hospitals and dialysis centers.”<sup>40</sup> This was said when China had no organ donation system. At the end of 2005, living donations accounted for only about 1.5% of all kidney transplants<sup>41</sup> and there was a total of just 73 living-donor liver transplants in China between 1995 and 2005.<sup>42</sup>

In this time period, Chinese surgeons developed liver extraction procedures with warm ischemia times (WITs) of under five minutes, which has since become an industry standard. Medical papers published in China also cited WITs between 0 and 10 minutes, claiming that the organs were sourced from brain-dead donors, cadavers, non-heart-beating cadavers, or healthy young cadavers.<sup>43</sup>

These WITs mean that the organ was still connected to the donor’s blood supply just minutes before it was cooled with cold perfusion.<sup>44</sup>

One possible scenario is that the donor was brain-dead. At that time, however, China had not yet adopted standards for determining brain death and did not have an organ donation system, making brain-dead donors a negligible source. Nationwide, there were fewer than 70 successful donations after brain death between 2001 and July 2010.<sup>45</sup> Furthermore, in Chinese medical papers, a large portion of transplant organs were listed as coming from “brain-dead donors” while the descriptions of organ procurement procedures indicated otherwise. In one published case, a “donor” was declared brain-dead with neither a determination of brain death nor meeting the criteria for cardiac death; the “brain-dead donor” was, in fact, a living human being.<sup>46</sup> This is not an isolated case as other medical journals have also recorded similar practices.

With cadavers (the only other scenario), 0-minute WITs would be possible only if the organs were prepared such that cold perfusion could be performed immediately as the blood supply ceases. The stoppage of blood flow could be caused by (1) the donor’s heartbeat stopping at exactly that moment, (2) the heartbeat being stopped by doctors, or (3) the supply artery to the organ being clamped by doctors while the heart continues beating. Any of the above possibilities would mean that organ

procurement, a surgical procedure requiring time to open body cavities and prepare organs, had already been started while the heart was still beating. In other words, WITs of 0 minutes could only be obtained if organs were procured from living people who became cadavers only as a result of the organ procurement process.

Techniques were also developed for the rapid extraction of abdominal organs by excising surrounding organs simultaneously, further reducing both organ damage and WITs. CITNAC stated in 2004, “Our department has adopted a quick combined abdominal organ-cutting technique to cut the liver, shorten the time of warm ischemia, reduce the rate of organ rejection, and facilitate the recovery of graft function.”<sup>47</sup> This procedure is widely used in many hospitals throughout China.

Other innovations have been developed to extract organs in the best possible condition for transplants. Wang Lijun, a high-profile law enforcement official who sought asylum at an American consulate in 2012, won an award for developing a new protective solution that substantially increased transplant success rate with organs extracted after lethal injections. This method was predicated on thousands of experiments on living bodies.<sup>48</sup>

### 3. Short Waiting Times

Hospitals in China normally quote wait times for organ transplants between days and weeks, including for re-transplants in case of failure. This was the case even before 2010, when China had no organ donation system,<sup>49</sup> and continued after 2015 when China announced its transition to voluntary donations, a source less abundant and readily available than death-row executions, the main source cited before 2015.<sup>50 51</sup>

The China Liver Transplant Registry reported in 2006 that more than 25% of cases were emergency transplants, for which organs were found within days or even hours.<sup>52</sup>

Investigative journalists from TV Chosun, a major South Korean TV station, conducted an on-site investigation in October 2017 and recorded hidden camera footage in which a nurse quoted wait times for organs ranging from days to weeks. They also documented that medical staff solicited monetary “donations” from patients in exchange for scheduling transplants even more quickly.<sup>53</sup>

China also reported many cases of wait times of between 0 and 1 days (see [Evidence 4: Short Wait Times](#)<sup>54</sup>). For example:

- A liver failure patient received a liver transplant on the same day that he was transferred to Huashan Hospital of Fudan University in Shanghai in April 2016.<sup>55</sup>
- Phoenix News reported on March 22, 2017 that the 1st Affiliated Hospital of Zhejiang University had completed 14 organ transplants within 48 hours. One of the patients was Mr. Yi, who had bled into his digestive tract due to liver cirrhosis. It was stated that the hospital happened to have a matching liver donor.<sup>56</sup>
- On September 3, 2017, the First Affiliated Hospital of Anhui Medical University completed 5 organ transplants in 48 hours, including for Mr. Song, a liver transplant patient who received a second liver transplant the day after his first transplanted liver failed.<sup>57</sup>

### III. Scale of China's Transplant System

After the year 2000, China came to perform more transplants than any other country in the world in just a few years despite the lack of a voluntary organ donation system.<sup>58 59</sup>

After allegations of forced organ harvesting from prisoners attracted international scrutiny in 2006, the Ministry of Health established a new approval system that required hospitals to obtain permits from the Ministry to continue performing transplants after July 2007. Of the more than 1,000 hospitals that applied, 164 were given permits. This change created a false impression that transplant volume decreased after July 2007. However, the large Ministry-approved institutions expanded significantly with full government support by adding more beds and new wards, wings and buildings.<sup>60</sup>

Based on government-imposed minimum transplant bed requirements for transplant centers (15 beds dedicated to liver transplantation and 20 beds dedicated to kidney transplantation), the 164 Ministry-approved transplant hospitals would have the capacity to conduct more than 70,000 transplants per year. However, most of the approved hospitals exceed the government-stipulated minimum bed counts. Some have hundreds of beds dedicated to organ transplantation with bed utilization rates between 100% and 200%. In addition, many centers that did not receive permits continued to perform transplants after 2007. The actual number of transplants performed yearly in China is therefore likely to be much higher than the minimum system capacity of 70,000 and an order of magnitude greater than the officially cited figures of between 10,000 to 15,000 transplants per year.<sup>61</sup>

In fact, this official figure is surpassed by just a handful of hospitals in China. For instance, the Oriental Organ Transplant Center in Tianjin opened in 2006 with 500 beds. Its bed utilization reached 90% in 2009 and 131% in 2013 before more beds were added. Even with 500 beds, a 100% utilization rate, and an average hospitalization time of 3 to 4 weeks, its transplant volume could have reached 6,000 to 8,000 per year.<sup>62</sup> On October 26-28, 2017, Korean investigative journalists from TV Chosun visited this transplant center, where they observed operating rooms in use around the clock. The day before the journalists' visit, the international department alone performed 3 kidney transplants (including one combined kidney-pancreas transplant) and 4 liver transplants. The center also housed foreign patients in a nearby hotel in addition to its own facilities, which includes three dedicated international transplant wards. These findings suggest that the center continues to perform thousands of transplants per year.<sup>63</sup>

### IV. Sources of Organs

In response to international criticism since 2006, Chinese officials claimed that almost all transplant organs came from death-row prisoners and, later, from voluntary donations. Our analysis shows that these sources could not have provided enough organs to supply the number of transplants performed.

#### 1. Number and Declining Trend of Death-Row Executions

International organizations estimate that death-row executions in China have numbered in the thousands each year since 2000. However, the rate of executions is in decline,<sup>64 65 66</sup> partially due to a new review process by the Supreme People's Court that began in January 2007. In the first year of Supreme Court review, the number of death-row sentences decreased by 30%; executions also decreased to 5,000 in 2008.<sup>67</sup>

In 2013, Huang Jiefu, Chairman of the National Organ Donation and Transplantation Committee and former Deputy Minister of Health, corroborated this trend by confirming that death-row executions had decreased by 10% each year for more than a decade and that there were, in fact, very few death-row prisoners.<sup>68</sup>

Additionally, Huang stated in 2016, “Transplants that rely on death-row organs had become ‘a stream without a source.’ The transition from death-row organs to citizen donations is a matter of life and death for China’s transplant industry.”<sup>69</sup>

## 2. Number of Donations<sup>70</sup>

China did not have an organ donation system until March 2010, when it first piloted a program in 19 provinces and cities.<sup>71</sup> Despite receiving only 207 donations in its first two years,<sup>72</sup> the program was expanded nationwide with the announcement of a national organ allocation system, the China Organ Transplant Response System (COTRS), in August 2013.<sup>73</sup>

Chinese government figures stated in September 2013 that 23% of organs used for transplant surgeries came from voluntary donations;<sup>74</sup> in 2014, they stated that 80% of transplant organs came from voluntary donations<sup>75</sup> and that China stopped using death-row organs completely in January 2015.<sup>76</sup> But this jump in donation figures appears to have been contrived after the fact to bridge the gap to China's supposed “new era” of ethical organ procurement.

Based on the proportion of registered donors to actual donors in the United States,<sup>77</sup> China’s heavily publicized 373,536 registered donors as of the end of 2017<sup>78</sup> would have yielded only a dozen actual organ donors. Organs procured from non-registered donors (mainly from intensive care units) could not be the main organ sources as suggested, as the sum of reported donations in each region (including both registered and non-registered donors) cannot support even the official government figure of 15,000 transplants each year.<sup>79</sup>

Several factors contribute to the insufficiency of voluntary organ donations in China.<sup>80</sup> These include longstanding cultural prohibitions and impediments to organ donation, a lack of legislation for brain death, an insufficient legal framework to guarantee ethical donations, and a lack of public trust in the medical system.

## 3. Extent of Implementation of the Donation and Allocation System

At the end of 2015, Huang Jiefu said that the National Organ Donation and Transplantation Committee he chaired “exists in name only.”<sup>81</sup> In 2017, Huang revealed further that China had only one person overseeing organ donation and transplantation, compared to 1,500 in the United States.<sup>82</sup> No agency provides oversight or enforcement for the day-to-day process of organ donation, procurement, and transplantation.

While COTRS is designed to manage all donors and recipients in the country,<sup>83</sup> only 31,000 potential recipients had been registered on the official website as of March 2017.<sup>84</sup> A phone survey ending in

June 2017 showed that most transplant hospitals in China could not access COTRS.<sup>85</sup> It thus follows that most transplant organs are highly unlikely to have come from COTRS.

In addition, China has not enacted fundamental laws governing organ sourcing, donation, procurement, allocation, and transplantation; its transplant regulations embed loopholes for illicit organ sourcing. Its administrative policies and regulations are heavily influenced by special interest groups and are not enforced in the medical system, nor can these regulations control the military, judiciary, and other entities that participate in transplantation.<sup>86</sup>

China's Organ Procurement Organizations (OPOs) are established inside ministry-approved transplant centers.<sup>87</sup> Huang Jiefu has acknowledged, "organ resources—all recipients and donors, the entire chain of organ donation and transplantation—are in the hospitals."<sup>88</sup> OPOs operate without oversight and include the same surgeons involved in unethical organ procurement.<sup>89</sup>

Huang Jiefu said in 2017 that 70% of organs came from brain-dead donors (DBD) and that the others were mainly from donation after brain death followed by circulatory death (DBCD).<sup>90</sup> However, 90% of doctors in China were unaware of a standard procedure to determine brain death as of late 2014.<sup>91</sup> This remained the case in 2017.<sup>92</sup> This contradiction suggests widespread abuse of brain death determination in China.

Death-row prisoners, who were re-categorized as voluntary citizen donors starting in 2015,<sup>93 94</sup> and voluntary donations combined can account for only a small fraction of all transplants performed in China. Thus, most of the organs must be coming from another source.

#### 4. Leading Role of the Chinese Government in Organ Procurement

Huang Jiefu said in a CCTV interview in 2015 that China built up its organ donation and transplant framework in only a few years, whereas in other countries this process required decades.<sup>95 96</sup> He further stated in 2017 that the difference between the Chinese model and that of the West is that China is the only country where a central government plays a leading role in developing organ donations and transplants.<sup>97</sup>

Nancy Ascher, former president of The Transplantation Society, also named strong government engagement as one of the most important factors in the "Chinese mode."<sup>98</sup>

According to its website in 2004, the China International Transplantation Network Assistance Center (CITNAC), which focused primarily on foreign patients, attributed its achievements to government support.<sup>99</sup>

"To be able to complete such a large number of organ transplant surgeries every year, we need to give all of our thanks to the support given by the government. In particular, the Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Health, and Ministry of Civil Affairs have jointly promulgated laws to

establish that organ procurement receives government support and protection. This is one of a kind in the world.”

## 5. History of the Use of Prisoners as Resources

China’s first recorded case of using prisoners for medical purposes was in 1940, when three “counterrevolutionaries” were killed on orders of Communist Party official Kang Sheng in order to produce cadavers for dissection.<sup>100</sup> Documents dating from 1962 show that the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Military Commission initiated a policy, still in place today, that all death row prisoners and serious offenders may be treated according to the needs of national and socialist development and can be dealt with according to “revolutionary protocol,”<sup>101</sup> under which enemies of the state are deprived of all rights and utilized as state resources.

China began to conduct experiments in organ transplantation in the 1960s.<sup>102</sup> The first recorded instance of organ harvesting from a Chinese political prisoner during execution was in 1978.<sup>103</sup> In 1984, multiple government bodies and ministries jointly promulgated a regulation allowing the bodies and organs of prisoners to be used at will by the State under certain conditions.<sup>104</sup> China later started using organs from prisoners of conscience and minorities, including Uyghurs, in the 1990s.<sup>105</sup>

There was no major development in this industry until 2000 when the Chinese government started prioritizing organ transplantation in its national strategy with significant investment in research, development, industrialization, and personnel training. The number of transplant centers in China grew from 150 before 1999<sup>106</sup> to 570 by the end of 2004<sup>107</sup> and more than 1,000 in 2007.<sup>108 109</sup> In the year 2000, the number of liver transplants performed reached ten times the number performed in 1999; by 2005, the number had tripled further.<sup>110</sup> This exponential rise of organ transplants, without support of a voluntary donation system, coincides exactly with the Chinese Communist Party’s campaign against Falun Gong, which was also included in the Tenth Five-Year Plan.<sup>111 112</sup>

## V. Campaign to Eradicate Falun Gong

### 1. About Falun Gong

Falun Gong is a Buddhist meditation system that was brought to the public in 1992 by Mr. Li Hongzhi, a Chinese chi gong master. The practice of Falun Gong entails both spiritual and physical components. The essence of the spiritual component is represented by the guiding principles of “Truthfulness, Compassion, and Tolerance,”<sup>113</sup> although “Tolerance” may also be translated as “Forbearance,” which contains aspects of the Christian ideal, “turn the other cheek.”

The physical component of Falun Gong comprises five gentle chi gong exercises, similar in appearance to Tai Chi, that have been shown to improve both health and well-being.<sup>114</sup> There are documented cases where the practice was instrumental in curing a wide range of ailments from depression to terminal cancer.<sup>115 116 117</sup>

Falun Gong neither adheres to religious formalities nor has a membership structure, and its classes and activities are open to the public and free of charge. It thus spread like wildfire throughout China, and according to Chinese government estimates, by 1999 there were over 70 million people practicing it on a regular basis.<sup>118</sup>

The Chinese government controls all religions and spiritual traditions in China with a very tight rein. It initially viewed Falun Gong as only a form of exercise but, in 1996, the Party became wary of its spiritual aspects and began a media campaign to discredit the practice.<sup>119</sup> Due to the moral underpinnings of Falun Gong, its reverence for the divine, and the spiritual and physical benefits of the practice, Falun Gong practitioners were undeterred by government criticism.

Falun Gong's surging popularity and theistic teachings, as well as the refusal of Falun Gong adherents to renounce the practice, led the Party to deem Falun Gong a serious threat to its ideological control. On July 20, 1999, the Communist Party, without legal basis, announced a ban on Falun Gong and mobilized the state's massive resources to eradicate it. Thus began one of the most brutal human rights abuses in history.

## 2. Creation of the "610 Office," the Nerve Center of the Eradication Campaign

Jiang Zemin made a speech at a Politburo Meeting on June 7, 1999 and declared that the CCP Central Committee had agreed to establish a "Central Leading Group for Handling the Falun Gong Issue."<sup>120</sup> Li Lanqing was appointed chair of the group, with Luo Gan and Ding Guangen as vice chairs. Member units included the Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, Central Propaganda Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other central agencies. Jiang required that "all CCP central departments, all ministries, all provinces, and all cities must cooperate with this group closely." The "610 Office" was created as an ad hoc agency under this central leading group and named after the date of its founding, June 10, 1999.<sup>121 122 123</sup> Over the next few months, each echelon of party committees, down to the local level, established their own "leading groups for handling the Falun Gong issue" and 610 Offices.<sup>124</sup>

In 2003, the Office of the Central Leading Group for Handling the Falun Gong Issue (the 610 Office) was given a second name, the "State Council Office for the Prevention and Handling of Cult-Related Issues." This agency is listed as a direct subordinate of the CCP Central Committee. The Central Leading Group for Handling the Falun Gong Issue was also renamed the "Central Leading Group for the Prevention and Handling of Cult-Related Issues."<sup>125</sup> All levels of the Office of the Prevention and Handling of Cult-Related Issues share the same offices as the Party's Political and Legal Affairs Committee. This configuration allowed the Party to directly operate the state machinery and control the work of the government. The 610 Office has since been expanded and strengthened into a gigantic system extending from top to bottom throughout the Party, government, military, enterprises, units, schools, and communities all over China.<sup>126</sup> It was endowed with extraordinarily broad and extralegal power to systematically eradicate Falun Gong. It later broadened its mandate from suppression of Falun Gong to include suppression of additional religious groups and qigong organizations that did not follow Communist Party directives.

The operations of the 610 Office are secret. Neither the CCP Central Committee nor the State Council acknowledge the existence of the agency in either public organizational charts or news

releases.<sup>127</sup> However, it has occasionally appeared in some reports and regional government websites. The Central Leading Group for the Prevention and Handling of Cult-Related Issues was first revealed in December 2013, but the report was later removed from the website.<sup>128</sup> Officials have also avoided acknowledging the agency's existence. For example, the head of the central 610 Office, Liu Jing, once avoided answering a question from a reporter regarding the 610 Office at a press conference hosted by the State Council Information Office on February 27, 2001.<sup>129</sup>

Orders issued by the 610 Office are classified documents, with some communicated only verbally. For example, among the 204 important documents received by the Suizhou Economic and Trade Commission in Hubei Province, the only one classified as top secret came from the provincial 610 Office.<sup>130</sup>

### 3. Launch of the Illegal Campaign

Forty days after the 610 Office was formed, the CCP Central Committee and the Government of China issued public notices to suppress Falun Gong. The official suppression of Falun Gong was marked by several documents issued around July 20, 1999.<sup>131</sup>

- Notice by the CCP Central Committee Prohibiting Party Members from Practicing Falun Dafa (July 19, 1999);<sup>132</sup>
- Decision by the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People's Republic of China to Ban the Falun Dafa Research Society (July 22, 1999);<sup>133</sup>
- Notice by the Ministry of Public Security of the People's Republic of China (July 22, 1999);<sup>134</sup> and
- Notice by the General Administration of Press and Publication of the People's Republic of China Regarding the Reaffirmation of Opinion for Handling Falun Gong Publications (July 22, 1999).<sup>135</sup>

Although the notices claimed that Falun Gong practitioners are “specially treated” because “Falun Gong is an illegal organization,” Falun Gong is a belief rather than an organization. The Chinese constitution guarantees the freedom of belief, and there exists no law in China stating that the practice of Falun Gong is illegal.<sup>136</sup>

On the contrary, the 610 Office of the Central Committee has been approved by neither the National People's Congress (NPC) nor the State Council; the above Party document is applicable only to Party members and not legally binding for society at large. Ministry notices also have no legislative or judicial power to decide the legality of an organization or a group. The establishment of the 610 Office, the above notices, and the persecution of Falun Gong all contravene the Constitution of the People's Republic of China in violation of Article 36 (freedom of religious belief), Article 5 (constitutional supremacy), and Article 89 (enumerated powers of the State Council).<sup>137</sup>

In addition to the above documents issued in the early days of the persecution, on October 30, 1999 the National People's Congress Standing Committee ratified a “Decision to Ban, Safeguard Against, and Punish Cult Activities.”<sup>138</sup> This is often cited as the basis of the campaign. However, it contravenes

Article 36 of the Constitution, rendering it invalid. Although the Chinese authorities typically use this and other anti-cult regulations to justify targeting Falun Gong practitioners, from a legal standpoint, the regulations themselves do not mention Falun Gong. On March 1, 2011, the General Administration of Press and Publication issued a decision to abolish the prohibition of Falun Gong publications in order to promote the rule of law.<sup>139</sup>

Thus, Falun Gong has never been legally banned by the government of China. The campaign to eradicate Falun Gong was launched by the personal will of Communist Party leader Jiang Zemin and has no legal basis. The 610 Office has no legal standing and derives its power only from the Communist Party leadership. The suppression of Falun Gong in the name of the State was made the most important “political task.”

#### 4. Incitement to Hatred

Violence often originates from hatred, and hatred usually arises from distorted information. This is thoroughly reflected in the Chinese regime’s persecution of Falun Gong.

The party-state has used nationwide propaganda campaigns as key tools in the suppression of Falun Gong. Since the persecution began in July 1999, the regime has used more than three thousand newspapers and magazines, as well as hundreds of television and radio stations to spread propaganda defaming Falun Gong. Between July and December 1999, CCTV broadcast anti-Falun Gong programs for seven hours each day, demonizing Falun Gong and its founder. It has also used Xinhua News Agency, China News Service, Party-controlled media overseas, and Chinese consulates to spread this propaganda globally. Within the same six months, Party-controlled media, both inside and outside of China, published a total of more than 300,000 articles defaming Falun Gong.<sup>140</sup>

In an interview with the French newspaper *Le Figaro* on October 25, 1999, Jiang Zemin called Falun Gong “an evil cult.”<sup>141</sup> During the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in New Zealand in September 1999, Jiang personally handed out a book defaming Falun Gong to other delegates, including President Clinton and other world leaders.<sup>142</sup> In a televised CBS interview in September 2000, Jiang continued his fabrications to slander Falun Gong.<sup>143</sup>

Meanwhile, the Chinese regime has spent an enormous amount of resources to control the flow of information on the internet. In December 1999, the State Council established a National Information Work Leadership Team led by Deputy Premier Wu Bangguo. A national internet censorship and monitoring system, the Great Firewall (formerly known as the Golden Shield) was implemented. Outside estimates claim that more than 300,000 personnel have been employed in the development and operation of the largest and most rigorous network monitoring system in the world.<sup>144</sup> The world’s major information technology companies, such as Cisco, Yahoo, Microsoft, Google, and Nortel have participated in this censorship system to varying extents. For example, one of the Golden Shield’s stated goals in a Cisco presentation was to “combat ‘Falun Gong’ evil religion and other hostiles.”<sup>145</sup>

According to a 2005 research report by Harvard professor John Palfrey, the Chinese regime blocked less than 10% of pornographic websites, 80% of political websites, and 100% of websites related to Falun Gong.<sup>146</sup>

In this enclosed environment, lies repeated a thousand times became the truth, and the public's sympathy for Falun Gong was replaced with hatred. The demonization of and incitement of hatred toward Falun Gong provided the basis on which crimes against practitioners could be justified. Many were left with no choice but to participate in the persecution, either directly or indirectly.

## 5. Policy of Destruction

The Party's policies with respect to Falun Gong were as follows (See testimonies of Zhang Zhongyu and Zhang Yijie in Appendix II):

“Party members are prohibited from practicing Falun Gong.”

“Three terminations and one detention”: being expelled from the party, removed from official posts, terminated from one's job, and detained.

“100% transformation (renouncing the practice) with absolutely no exceptions.”

On November 30, 1999, the Central 610 Office called more than 3,000 officials to the Great Hall of the People to address the campaign against Falun Gong. The head of the Central Leading Group on Dealing with the Falun Gong Issue, Li Lanqing, announced the government's new policy: “Crush them politically, cut them off financially, and ruin their reputations.” (See testimony of Li Baigen in Appendix II)

On August 21, 2000, the Ministry of Public Security held a nationwide telephone conference to relay new orders that the practice of Falun Gong was to be eradicated in three months.<sup>147</sup>

The third issue of *News Front* in 2001 stated, “This battle is prolonged, complex, and poignant... We must persevere with our efforts... make the battle against Falun Gong an important political task for news propaganda... overcome numbness, slackening, and tiredness... fight well the propaganda battle to expose [Falun Gong], fight well the battle to tackle educational transformation, and fight well the prolonged battle to resist cults.”<sup>148</sup>

Even though this revealed that Falun Gong had not been eradicated in three months as Jiang Zemin had planned and that the persecution lacked support both from the public and within the Communist Party, the Party made attacking Falun Gong an important political task. The central 610 Office staged a “self-immolation” hoax on Tiananmen Square on January 23, 2001 and continually broadcast it through every form of state-controlled media to incite hatred against Falun Gong.<sup>149</sup> It has continued to carry out various other “battles” against Falun Gong.

In early September 2001, after being subjected to intense pressure from the international community, the Chinese judicial system ordered the release of illegally detained Falun Gong practitioners, especially those who were being held beyond their terms. However, Luo Gan, the head of the Central 610 Office, issued a secret order to all levels of the judicial system: “Whoever is found to be practicing Falun Gong should be secretly arrested and sentenced to a life sentence until death. Police officers that do not arrest Falun Gong practitioners will be discharged from public service, and their permanent residency registrations will be revoked.”<sup>150</sup>

Eighteen Falun Gong practitioners tapped into the state cable television broadcast network around 8:00 p.m. on March 5, 2002 in Changchun, Jilin Province. They broadcast programs on eight channels simultaneously for about 45 minutes to counter the defamatory propaganda against Falun Gong that saturated all the state-controlled programming. Luo Gan, the head of the Central Leading Group for Handling the Falun Gong Issue, and Liu Jing, the head of the Office of the Central Leading Group for Handling the Falun Gong Issue (the 610 Office), personally went to Jilin Province and delivered a secret order to kill Falun Gong practitioners on sight. He also instructed that police were authorized to shoot practitioners to death when they found Falun Gong stickers or banners posted in public. Liu Chengjun, a key person involved in the cable tapping operation, was shot in the leg during his arrest as a direct result of this order. Luo set a quota for every police officer to arrest practitioners, threatening both their and their commanders' jobs.<sup>151</sup> Within days, more than 5,000 practitioners in the Changchun area were arrested. Seven of them were beaten to death days later. Among the eighteen practitioners involved in the cable tapping, two were tortured to death, one's whereabouts is unknown, the other fifteen were sentenced to between four and twenty years in prison, and at least three of them were later persecuted to death.<sup>152</sup>

In mid-March, Jiang Zemin issued another directive. "Beating them to death is nothing. If they are disabled from the beating, it counts as their injuring themselves. If they die, it counts as suicide!" (See Zhang Zhongyu's testimony in Appendix II)

Later, several directives were propagated to all levels of the 610 Office.<sup>153</sup>

- Eradicating Falun Gong is an arduous political task; do not be afraid of bloodshed and deaths;
- Tightly conceal the deaths and prevent leaking of information, which could lead to negative international impact; and
- All levels of the prosecution and judiciary branches of the government should not conduct investigations into the deaths or injuries of Falun Gong practitioners. Everything should give way to the big picture.

In 2002, Jiang Zemin promoted Zhou Yongkang to be Minister of Public Security and Deputy Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Committee, which handles policy guidelines and directs the work of the Supreme People's Procuratorate, the Supreme People's Law, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Public Security.<sup>154</sup> Zhou made the eradication of Falun Gong a major focus of domestic security work in China.

Du Daobin, a former Hubei provincial government worker, also reported in May 2003 that the local 610 Office had received instructions that stated, "No law regulates the treatment of Falun Gong practitioners" and "deaths of Falun Gong practitioners from beating are nothing and shall be counted as suicide; the bodies shall be directly cremated without investigating the person's identification."<sup>155</sup>

Numerous cases of practitioners' bodies being cremated without the consent of their families continue to be reported on [Minghui.org](http://Minghui.org), a website that publishes first-hand accounts of Falun Gong practitioners persecuted in China.

In October 2007, Zhou Yongkang was promoted to head the "Central Leading Group for Handling the Falun Gong Issue" and was placed on the Party's highest strategic tier, the Politburo Standing Committee, to further carry out the Party's campaign against Falun Gong.

In early 2010, the central 610 Office initiated the “2010-2012 War for Educational Transformation and Unity.”<sup>156</sup>

In early 2013, the central 610 Office initiated the “2013-2015 Decisive Battle in Educational Transformation Against Falun Gong Practitioners.”<sup>157</sup> This was carried out through each level of the 610 Office and “anti-cult associations” and extended through the provincial, city, district, and county levels all the way down to local communities and villages, the smallest social units.

Under international pressure, the Chinese regime announced on November 15, 2013 that forced labor camps were to be abolished.<sup>158</sup> In the same month, the Ministry of Justice issued a document stating, “Many labor camps are currently co-labeled as drug rehabilitation centers. Drug rehabilitation centers oversee more than 100,000 patients. After the labor camp system is nullified, the majority are able to relabel themselves as drug rehabilitation centers. Labor camps in areas that do not need drug rehabilitation centers can be directly converted into prisons.”<sup>159</sup> The persecution of Falun Gong has not abated with the abolition of labor camps. Rather, it has become more hidden.

At the end of 2013, amid charges of corruption and plotting to stage a coup, the new CCP leadership removed Zhou Yongkang from his positions as Minister of Public Security, Deputy Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Committee, head the Central Leading Group for Handling the Falun Gong Issue, and the Politburo Standing Committee.

However, the machinery set in place to eradicate Falun Gong has not been dismantled and continues to operate today. The extension of the persecution of Falun Gong practitioners to the attorneys who defend their right to freedom of belief and to anyone else who speaks out in support of Falun Gong clearly demonstrates that the persecution of Falun Gong is far from over.

For example, in a coordinated operation that began on July 9, 2015, as of August 21 of the same year, police arrested, summoned, detained, and disappeared 276 lawyers, civil rights activists, and their family members across 23 provinces. Some of their whereabouts are unknown.<sup>160</sup>

On December 25, 2015, Meng Jianzhu, Party Secretary of the Central Political and Legislative Affairs Committee and head of the Central Leading Group for the Prevention and Handling of Cult-Related Issues, said in a speech at an all-cadre meeting of the latter office that one of the agency’s major achievements of 2015 was “striking at and handling Falun Gong’s abusive filing of lawsuits and a small number of lawyers who had a hand in hyping up these cult cases, maintaining overall sociopolitical stability.”<sup>161</sup> These lawsuits referred to criminal complaints filed by Falun Gong practitioners against Jiang Zemin for his role in driving the persecution.

Among the persecuted attorneys was Wang Quanzhang, who was illegally arrested in August 2015 and disappeared for more than a thousand days. His wife, Li Wenzu, looked everywhere for help to find him until she received the news on July 13, 2018 that her husband was still alive. During this time, he was tortured with electric shocks, among other methods, and forcibly administered unknown drugs.<sup>162</sup> On January 28, 2019, a court sentenced him to imprisonment for four years and six months and deprivation of political rights for five years on charges of “subverting state power.”<sup>163</sup>

Even before this arrest, Wang was often threatened and beaten by the authorities for defending the rights of Falun Gong practitioners. His wife revealed, “When Quanzhang was defending a Falun Gong practitioner once, he said one sentence, a bailiff slapped him in the face and asked if he wanted to keep talking. He did, so he was hit again. Altogether he was hit more than a hundred times.”<sup>164</sup>

More lawyers have been harassed, threatened and monitored around the clock, beaten, detained, forcibly administered unknown drugs, had their law licenses illegally revoked and were prevented from traveling abroad. Their families and relatives have also been threatened.

## 6. “Transformation”

The primary goal of the CCP is to “transform” practitioners by destroying their belief and conscience.<sup>165</sup> In the face of orders to achieve “100% transformation with absolutely no exceptions,” almost all Falun Gong practitioners who persisted in their belief suffered inhumane torture without regard for age, social class, or occupation. (See testimonies of Zhang Yijie and Zhang Zhongyu in Appendix II)

### a) Standards for “Transformation”

The earliest transformation standards appeared in the Notice by the CCP Central Committee Prohibiting Party Members from Practicing Falun Dafa on July 19, 1999.<sup>166</sup> The notice stated that “the task of transforming CCP members who practice Falun Dafa must be accomplished well” and defined the standard for one’s “transformation” as “to voluntarily separate from Falun Gong organizations, to mentally sever one’s relationship with it, and to expose and criticize Falun Gong and its founder.”

On August 24, 1999, Xinhua News Agency published a notice from the General Office of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council that extended the above policy from Party members to all Falun Gong practitioners “to better accomplish the mission of transforming the majority of Falun Gong practitioners.” These documents emphasized that even for “those who practice Falun Gong solely for the purposes of health and fitness,” if they do not hold the “correct [political] opinion” and do not give up their faith, then they must also be transformed.<sup>167</sup>

In a series of later documents, the 610 Office instructed offices in all regions “to seriously get to the bottom of, investigate, and completely clarify the backgrounds of all un-transformed [Falun Gong practitioners].” They required that “for those un-transformed Falun Gong practitioners (even if they only practice at home), with absolutely no exceptions, to send them batch-by-batch to legal education centers [brainwashing facilities—authors’ note] for transformation.”<sup>168</sup>

Masanjia Forced Labor Camp later developed a set of standards, which the head of the Central 610 Office, Wang Maolin, introduced at the “Ministry of Justice Education and Transformation Work Sharing and Award Meeting,” held on August 29, 2000.<sup>169</sup> The five standards to which Falun Gong practitioners must adhere include: relinquishing the practice, writing a repentance statement, surrendering all Falun Gong books and materials, writing testimonials against Falun Gong and the founder, and transforming other practitioners.

If even one of these standards is not met, one is not considered to be transformed. Transformation leads to leniency, shortening of one's term, serving one's term outside the prison or labor camp, and being released before serving the full term. The CCP Central 610 Office officially promulgated the Masanjia transformation standards to the entire country. A document issued on September 22, 2000 stipulated that practitioners had to publicly denounce Falun Gong, no longer participate in Falun Gong activities, no longer study or practice Falun Gong, turn in all their Falun Gong books and related items, expose the identities of those who organize Falun Gong activities, and actively participate in the transformation of other Falun Gong practitioners.<sup>170</sup>

There are also unofficial criteria. According to the head of a legal education center, "You are considered completely 'transformed' if we see you beat and swear at your fellow practitioners." A converted practitioner must lie, slander Falun Gong and its founder, and betray and beat fellow practitioners in order to prove that one has completely renounced Falun Gong. Refusing to do these things indicates that one has not completely broken away from Falun Gong, in which case the person is further tortured until he or she relents or collapses.<sup>171</sup>

## b) Coercion Through Social and Family Pressure

The Communist Party has mobilized not only the state apparatus but also the entire society to force practitioners to renounce their faith. The persecution thus exerts pressure on both practitioners (both those in state custody and those who are not) as well as non-practitioners, i.e. the entire Chinese population.

Officials at all levels have been compelled to carry out the eradication campaign through a combination of political pressure, economic and career incentives, and collective punishment. For example, regional officials were held responsible for "transgressions" of Falun Gong practitioners in their jurisdictions. A policy in Shenyang stipulated that if three or more Falun Gong practitioners went to petition in Beijing within a month, the city's party secretary would be sent to the provincial government to be reprimanded, punished, or even dismissed.<sup>172</sup> To protect their jobs, officials in various cities across China deployed a large number of police and significant financial resources to prevent Falun Gong practitioners from going to Beijing. One town mayor in Shenyang was dismissed because practitioners from the town repeatedly went to petition in Beijing.

Employers have been forced to pressure practitioners within their organizations to renounce Falun Gong, including threatening termination of their employment or sending them to brainwashing classes. Entire work units have been subjected to collective punishment, including having bonuses and promotions withheld, to incite hatred against and pressure practitioners in the unit. Neighborhood and community offices are also forced and incentivized to monitor and report on the activities of local Falun Gong practitioners.<sup>173</sup>

Schools in many regions forced students to sign statements defaming Falun Gong under the threat of expulsion. Companies forced employees to sign denunciations against Falun Gong by threatening their jobs and pensions. Similarly, police officers were threatened that if they did not carry out orders from the 610 Office, they would lose their pay, housing, or even their jobs. In one case, the former president of the People's Liberation Army General Hospital (No.301), Li Qihua, wrote a letter describing his positive experience of practicing Falun Gong. In response, then-Vice Chairman of the

CCP Central Military Commission (CMC), Zhang Wannian, reported him to Jiang Zemin, who then wrote a long letter to the Politburo, Secretariat, and CMC leadership. Zhang began sending officers to speak with Li Qihua, who was over 80 years old, on a daily basis, attempting to force him to renounce Falun Gong by exhausting him with non-stop conversations. Eventually, a “repentance statement” was fabricated to set Li up as a model of a transformed practitioner for the whole army.<sup>174</sup>

CCP authorities also regularly coerce family members and coworkers of practitioners to persuade them to give up their practice, including threatening family members’ livelihoods and access to education, divorce and severance. Family members (including those of older generations) are sometimes made to beg on their knees in front of practitioners when visiting them in custody in order to pressure them to give up the practice.<sup>175</sup>

The communist regime has effectively turned some family settings into prisons and family members into accomplices who help in the transformation of practitioners. In one example, a practitioner named Lin Chengtao, a prominent medical scholar, was sent to Beijing Tuanhe Labor Camp in October 2001, where he was severely tortured. When he still did not give up Falun Gong, his wife, who had been transformed by Beijing Xin’an (Female) Labor Camp, wrote to Tuanhe Labor Camp suggesting that they use electric batons, beatings, mental agitation, and sleep deprivation to force her husband to transform. Lin was forced to read his wife’s letter repeatedly until he lost his sanity.<sup>176</sup>

In a more extreme case, Falun Gong practitioner Yang Lirong was injured by her husband on February 9, 2002, in Baoding City, Hebei Province.<sup>177</sup> She was arrested and detained for going to Beijing to petition the central government for the right to practice Falun Gong in October 1999, and released after police extorted 5,000 yuan from her family. Police later harassed her at home, sent her to a brainwashing center three times, and frequently extorted money from her family. The authorities threatened to terminate her husband’s employment because of his wife’s practicing of Falun Gong. On February 8, 2002, after police ransacked the couple’s home, Yang’s husband had a mental breakdown and strangled her. Upon receiving the report, officers and doctors arrived quickly and hurriedly cut open Yang’s body (which was still warm at the time) and took away many organs. Her excised heart radiated heat and bled profusely. A police officer at the scene said, “How is this dissecting a corpse? It’s dissecting a living body!”

Starting in January 2010, the Ministry of Railways began to require personal identification before passengers are able to board trains in the name of combating ticket scalping. Numerous Falun Gong practitioners have been arrested at train stations after their identification cards were scanned. The regime has since expanded the identification requirement to many other aspects of daily life, including buying phone cards (September 2015), sending express mail (May 2018), and boarding long-haul buses (March 2017). Police have also started inspecting private cars in cities, requiring identification documents for the driver and all passengers. Subway systems implemented entryway facial recognition cameras in January 2018.

A “social credit” system<sup>178</sup> was announced in September 2018 and is slated to take effect across mainland China in 2020, under which all citizens will be monitored around the clock and given a behavior score using facial recognition; voice recognition; identification checks; internet browsing history; social media activity; online purchases; personal government records (including medical, education, religious, and criminal history); and with whom one associates. For example, one would have points deducted for holding a belief the CCP identifies as “cultish,” being imprisoned or given

administrative punishments, speaking not in accordance with the Party's political views, and even having friends or relatives who express views unfavorable to the Party. Those with low social credit scores will not be allowed to board airplanes or high-speed trains, hold a government job, or take out a loan; their children's schooling and their relatives' employment can also be affected.

The Chinese regime has also been building a massive national surveillance system consisting of "Skynet" (a video surveillance system), "Safe-City" (a comprehensive urban security management system), and "Sharp Eyes" (a real-time surveillance network in rural areas). According to the *New York Times*, these platforms have already installed over 200 million cameras nationwide with 300 million more to be added before 2020. Most of these cameras can quickly recognize faces and conduct gait analyses. These systems were initially deployed to constrain the activities of Falun Gong practitioners but have been expanded in Xinjiang to spy on every citizen in an effort to identify and eliminate any potential uprisings against the party. These surveillance and control mechanisms are planned to be fully implemented nationwide by 2020.<sup>179</sup>

### c) Torture

The Chinese regime uses intricately designed mental and physical torture methods to force practitioners to renounce their faith and betray their conscience. Xu Youfang, the Heilongjiang provincial party secretary at the time, instructed subordinates that "Nothing was too much when it came to Falun Gong."<sup>180</sup>

Lawyer Wang Yonghang was illegally arrested in 2009 and sentenced to seven years in prison. After his release, he revealed that since February 2012, Shenyang First Prison started a movement to "destroy Falun Gong within the prison" along with a slogan: you "either die or transform." Wang said, "The suffering of countless Falun Gong practitioners [in the prison], if we don't talk about it, people on the outside would never know. Even if we say it, some people may not believe it, because the evilness of this persecution has reached an unbelievable degree."<sup>181</sup>

A police officer once yelled out while torturing human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng (who represented Falun Gong practitioners, although he did not practice himself), "Torturing Falun Gong, it's all true. The twelve torture methods we're using to deal with you, we developed with the Falun Gong!"<sup>182</sup>

"Stewing the eagle," long-term deprivation of sleep beyond human physiological limits, is a very common form of mental and physical torture. American psychiatrist John Allan Hobson stated in his book, *Sleep*, "After we go five to ten days without sleep, our brain loses its bearings altogether and madness takes over; the trusting become paranoid; the rational, irrational; and the sane begin to see and hear things that aren't there."<sup>183</sup> They are thus more likely to sign statements that oppose their beliefs. A police officer in a Chinese labor camp said to a Falun Gong practitioner, "We use the methods we use against spies to break you and then transform you."<sup>184</sup>

Zhang Yijie, who once served as a diplomat of the Chinese Embassy in Romania and headed the State Council's General Office of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, was forced to renounce her faith by various means, such as threatening to destroy the career of her husband and children, divorce and severance, dismissal, sentence and torture. This experience included 42 continuous days of sleep deprivation.

After the first 18-day “siege” failed to yield results, Zhang was held in an isolated room between November 8 and December 20, 2001. There, police officers, drug addicts, prostitutes, and “transformed” practitioners, a total of nine people, worked in shifts around the clock to keep her from leaning against the wall or falling asleep. Under this tight monitoring, she was made to stand for 42 days. If she fell asleep, she would be beaten in the head with a rod or have a basin of ice water poured into her shirt collar. She was stripped of her outerwear and made to freeze in the frigid Beijing winter. She was given only a small piece of cornbread for each meal and often denied water for two to three days at a time. She was also not allowed to wash or use the restroom. When she became incontinent, she was pushed into and dragged through a pool of urine. After more than 30 days of sleep deprivation, hunger, thirst, and fatigue, she lost consciousness, struck a wall, and fell to the floor. Officers brought in basin after basin of cold water and poured it on her. She was awakened by being drenched in the icy water. Shivering, she stood back up and was made to stand day and night, one day after another. In this way, she would fall, stand up, be drenched in water, and endure freezing, hunger, thirst, and fatigue. After 42 days, still refusing to be “transformed,” she was subjected to more violence: four drug-addict prostitutes kicked her, leaving her bloody and bruised all over and clinging to life for 17 days. With steadfast faith in Falun Dafa, she eventually recovered from being on the verge of death. (See Zhang Yijie’s testimony in Appendix II)

There is much evidence of the horrific torture used in labor camps, detention centers, prisons, mental hospitals, drug rehabilitation centers, and brainwashing centers. Set forth below is a sampling of the more than 100 torture methods that are used to brutalize Falun Gong practitioners:<sup>185</sup>

- shocking with multiple high-voltage electric batons at the same time: body parts shocked include the mouth, head, face, chest, breasts, genitals, and others;
- various other methods of electrocution;
- rape, gang rape, and other sexual torture;
- burning with hot iron rods, melted wax, and boiling water;
- hanging from handcuffs and shackles in various postures;
- beating with sticks, clubs and whips, including rubber clubs, spiked sticks, leather whips, copper wire whips, steel bars, etc.;
- hammering bamboo sticks and metal nails into the fingers, so deep they reach the bones;
- pinching the flesh with pliers;
- tiger bench, death bed, iron chairs, small stools, and other confining devices;
- freezing: stripping practitioners of their clothes and burying them in the snow for hours; pouring cold water all over the body in the winter;
- forcing practitioners to stand under the sun in the scorching heat of summer;
- dungeons and water dungeons, and long-term solitary confinement;
- force-feeding pepper water, concentrated salt water and feces through a large-diameter plastic tube;
- denying food, water, and restroom use.

In a secret interrogation room on the outskirts of the No.1 Division of the Changchun Public Security Bureau, Zhang Zhongyu, a vice editor of the provincial secondary journal, was confined to an “iron chair” for a few days in September 2001. The police used high-voltage electric batons to shock his entire body, especially his sensitive parts and genitals. His face and body were burned black. Officers covered his head with layers of plastic bags, put a metal bucket on his head, beat the bucket with a club, and lit cigarettes to add smoke to the interior. They cuffed his hands behind his back and repeatedly rotated his arms forcibly from the back to the front of his body, among other torture. (See Zhang Zhongyu’s testimony in Appendix II)

His fellow practitioner, Liu Haibo, a 34-year-old doctor from the CT Section of Luyuan District Hospital, had a long electric baton inserted into his anus, which directly shocked his internal organs until he died.<sup>186</sup> At this secret torture chamber on Jingyue Mountain, Jingyuetan, Changchun City, at least 23 practitioners were tortured to death.

Another practitioner Zhang knew, a 60-year-old woman named Wang Yuhuan, was once tortured on a tiger bench for three days and two nights and was additionally savagely tortured every five minutes. Guards poured scalding hot or freezing water on her after she lost consciousness; after she came to, they continued the torture. They shocked her head and face until they were scorched; they burned her eyes with cigarettes and stabbed the inside of her ears with thin bamboo sticks, which pierced her eardrums and caused permanent hearing loss. Guards stripped Wang and other female practitioners naked, spread their limbs, tied them to hard wooden planks for 26 days, and humiliated them in every way possible. Wang was finally killed in 2017.

Between 1999 and 2009, among the practitioners Zhang knew personally, more than 20 were tortured to death.

#### d) Forced Drug Administration

Drugging is a common method used to “transform” practitioners. Guidelines written in the “Anti-Cult Internal Teaching Reference Materials” include, “When necessary, drug intervention, medical methods, and clinical experimentation can be used to achieve the purpose of scientific transformation.”

For practitioners who do not renounce their faith, the policy effectively allows the use of drugs that damage or destroy their central nervous system, organs, and/or brain, or even cause death. This method of killing allows most victims to survive for a short period of time rather than die immediately, thereby allowing the authorities to evade responsibility for murder. The regime permits all levels of the 610 Office, prisons, labor camps, mental hospitals, brainwashing centers, and black jails to use drugs to disorient, disable, and even kill Falun Gong practitioners.<sup>187</sup>

Minghui.org has published reports of more than 11,000 incidents of forced drug administration that have caused disability, mental illness, or death in Falun Gong practitioners. Such use of drugs has been reported in 23 provinces, centrally controlled municipalities, and autonomous regions. Most mental hospitals and psychiatric departments have been made to participate in this type of persecution in violation of medical ethics. Some participating doctors have confessed that failing to carry out this political task would mean losing their employment.<sup>188</sup>

## 7. Physical Destruction

Faced with a practitioner who refuses to “transform” via mental and physical torture, to destroy physically is the last means used by the regime to achieve its desired “100% conversion rate.”

The experience of Chen Shulan, a resident of Beijing, is particularly poignant.<sup>189</sup> Her nuclear family in Hebei Province had two sisters, two brothers, and her parents, all of whom practiced Falun Gong. All five other members of her family were killed in the persecution, leaving Shulan as the sole survivor.

Shulan’s younger brother, Chen Aizhong, was arrested for petitioning the central government in Beijing in 2001. He was tortured for seven days and four nights, including being stripped of his clothes and buried in the snow for three hours. Even though his hands and feet were crippled as a result of the torture, Aizhong was illegally sentenced on September 12, 2001, to three years in Hehuakeng Forced Labor Camp.

Nine days later, on September 21, Shulan was notified by local officials that Aizhong had died due to a hunger strike. In the mortuary, Shulan found that her brother's body had been visibly cleaned up, yet his ears were swollen, looked black, and one was full of blood. When Shulan opened his clothes, she saw a wound of over 10 centimeters on the left side of his chest, with a large bloody bruise extending from his shoulders to his back.

When Shulan asked to take photographs, forensic identification, and documentation of Aizhong’s death in writing, the officer from the 610 Office denied her request, while the head of the forced labor camp told Shulan that her demands would be met if she signed a statement saying that Aizhong died of kidney failure. However, Aizhong's body was cremated two days later without notice despite his relatives’ opposition, and his family never received his ashes.

One year later, Shulan was sentenced to seven and a half years in prison after she publicized the details of her brother’s death. Local authorities persuaded her father, Chen Yunchuan, to abandon his complaint over his son’s death in exchange for a big pension or housing. He was crushed to death by an unknown vehicle in January 2009.

Her younger sister, Hongping, died shortly after her release from a labor camp in March 2003 after being administered drugs. Her second brother, Aili, was released from prison barely clinging to life; he died in November 2004. Shulan’s mother, Wang Lianrong, died on August 4, 2006, after losing her children one by one.

However, the 610 Office claimed these family members died suddenly of heart disease, kidney failure and vehicular trauma.

This is only a microcosm of the families of hundreds of thousands of persecuted Falun Gong practitioners in mainland China.

## VI. Mass Murder in China's Organ Transplant Industry

After the persecution first began in July 1999, millions of Falun Gong practitioners from around China traveled to Beijing to appeal to the central government. Many of them were arrested but were unwilling to disclose their identities to protect their families and friends. They thus became part of a large anonymous population held captive by the communist regime. In the following years, many more practitioners were rounded up all across China.

Falun Gong practitioners, the largest group of prisoners of conscience in China, are frequently subjected to blood tests and medical examinations related to organ function.<sup>190</sup> These tests are not administered to the general prison population, however, but only to Falun Gong practitioners and other prisoners of conscience.<sup>191 192 193 194</sup> The exams differed by location but invariably included a blood test, urine test, EKG, and x-rays of the abdomen, as well as follow-up medical tests that usually correspond to tissue matching.<sup>195</sup> “It is unlikely that the testing and examination serve a health purpose,” concluded investigators David Kilgour and David Matas.<sup>196</sup>

Minghui.org has published numerous firsthand accounts of police routinely going to the homes of practitioners to forcibly take DNA samples and administer blood tests. For example, in April 2014, police in Guizhou, Liaoning, Hunan, Hubei, Beijing and other locations entered practitioners' homes and forcibly took blood samples and cheek swabs. The officers claimed to be following orders from above.<sup>197</sup>

In September 2003, the *Public Health* newspaper reported that Huang Jiefu, then Deputy Minister of Health, had held a lecture on China's organ transplant legislation in Xiangya Third Hospital of Central South University. He suggested that setting up an organ allocation network could resolve the chaotic situation of organ allocation and management. “With the participation of the health administrative department, an organ allocation network at the provincial, regional and national levels could be gradually formed. The deployment of the network would prevent back-and-forth transportation of source organs and cut the surgical cost by half. Also, transplant quality can be greatly improved, because the waiting time can be shortened.”<sup>198</sup> This proposal, made a full decade before a national organ donation system was established in China, suggests the existence of a huge living organ bank.

China's public security system had already built a national biological database of more than 40 million individuals by 2017.<sup>199</sup>

Many Falun Gong survivors of inhumane torture, nearly to the point of death, reported being forced to submit to blood tests and physical examinations; many practitioners who refused to renounce their faith simply disappeared.

Relatives of victims and missing persons as well as survivors have provided ample testimony and reports that Falun Gong practitioners were killed for organs or targeted for organ procurement. For example, the family of Jiang Xiqing (male, age 66, Chongqing) was notified on January 29, 2009 that he had died. He appeared healthy when his family visited him in a labor camp the previous day. When Jiang's relatives found that his body was still warm despite being in the mortuary freezer for hours and called for medical assistance, they were forcibly removed by police officers. Two days later, the family was informed that the father had been cremated after his organs were removed for “making specimens.”

Several representative cases and testimonies are included in Appendix I and Appendix II. Due to safety considerations, testimonies of survivors who escaped organ harvesting are omitted from this report but are available upon request.

The collection of blood and DNA samples has recently been expanded from Falun Gong to include Uyghurs and other groups. Human Rights Watch reported that throughout 2017, the Chinese government forcibly collected biological data, including DNA and blood samples, from 19 million Uyghurs under the guise of a free public health program in which all citizens are given physical examinations.<sup>200</sup> More than one million Uyghurs and other minorities were being detained in political reeducation camps in Xinjiang as of October 9, 2018.<sup>201</sup> Furthermore, police in many other regions are also collecting DNA samples on a large scale without providing any reasons for doing so. Nationwide, police have set a goal to double the number of DNA records to 100 million by 2020.<sup>202</sup>

The development of such databases suggests that the regime plans to use these systems to expand its surveillance and ideological control over a wider population.

## 1. Direction of Organ Harvesting from Highest Levels

On September 30, 2014, Bai Shuzhong, former head of the People's Liberation Army, General Logistics Department, Health Division, was questioned by an investigator who assumed the identity of a Party investigator. Bai revealed that former Communist Party leader Jiang Zemin had directly ordered the harvesting of organs from Falun Gong practitioners and that it was not limited to the military.<sup>203</sup>

“Chairman Jiang, when he was in the position, put a lot of emphasis [on this issue], he gave instructions on this ... about selling people's kidneys for transplant surgeries. I should say, it was not just the military that was doing kidney transplants. After Jiang issued the order, we all did a lot of work against Falun Gong ... We directly control the military medical universities. They are directly affiliated with the People's Liberation Army General Logistics Department, and they received repeated orders.”

Bai's tenure in this position spanned from 1998 to 2004 and included the first five years of the persecution of Falun Gong. As the top officer in charge of logistics for the military health system, he would have been the primary person responsible for implementing the extermination policy.

On September 13, 2006, Bo Xilai, then-Minister of Commerce, visited Hamburg, Germany in the company of then-Premier Wen Jiabao. Bo received a phone call from an investigator posing as the First Secretary of the Chinese Embassy in Germany. Bo was asked who had issued the order to harvest organs from living Falun Gong practitioners, and he answered that it was “Chairman Jiang” who gave the order.<sup>204</sup>

## 2. Party Discipline and Indoctrination

For the Communist Party, the state is a tool for maintaining its rule, and laws are but a manifestation of the will of the Party. Under its long-term brainwashing and indoctrination programs, the Party has become the representative of the ruling class, with the leader's will becoming the will of the state.

The Party's high-pressure, harsh political governance has developed a system in which "individual Party members are subordinate to the Party organization, the minority is subordinate to the majority, the lower Party organizations are subordinate to the higher Party organizations, and all the constituent organizations and members of the Party are subordinate to the Central Committee of the Party."<sup>205</sup> Any noncompliant individual or organization is punished severely.

Thus, when Jiang Zemin, as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, gave the order to eradicate Falun Gong, he was able to direct the entire Party and even all of society to carry out his will using any means necessary outside of the limits of the law.

Below are some of the indoctrination techniques that have enabled doctors to rationalize harvesting organs from living people.

Enver Tohti, a former Uyghur surgeon educated and raised in China, currently lives in London. He was told to extract the organs from a living prisoner at an execution site in 1995. He explains in his testimony how doctors in China become involved in killing for organs.

"Anybody, if they label themselves [anything] other than communist, or Communist Party member, then they will be treated as an enemy of the state. Therefore, they are not even qualified as human beings. Therefore, they are subject to whatever punishment is available."

"They (the Party) made you unable to think [for] yourself. My whole body became a robot and [did] what I had been programmed to do..." "All the people [who] graduated from their system, they too have the same mindset; they are the product of the CCP. At the time, we believed that it was a glorious thing to be able to participate in doing away with the country's enemies, even genuinely believing what we were doing [was] for a good cause."<sup>206</sup>

Officials in China's organ transplantation industry actively led this campaign in the medical profession. In February 2001, Huang Jiefu, then director of the transplant department of the First Affiliated Hospital of Sun Yat-Sen University, told the media, "Opposing Falun Gong is a grave political struggle. We must not be softhearted when dealing with a little group of hardcore reactionaries."<sup>207 208</sup> Soon afterwards, Huang Jiefu was promoted to Deputy Minister of Health the following November.<sup>209</sup>

Huang has not only made every effort to promote the industrialization of organ transplantation in China in the absence of donations, but he also personally conducted a large number of transplant surgeries. In a 2013 interview, Huang stated that he performed more than 500 liver transplants in 2012 alone and that one of them in November was "the first voluntary citizen donation meeting Chinese standards."<sup>210</sup> Where were the hundreds of livers transplanted before that sourced from?

Zheng Shusen, in addition to his role as one of China's most prominent transplant surgeons, also chairs the Zhejiang Province Anti-Cult Association, which was established by the Communist Party leadership specifically to demonize Falun Gong and oversee the transformation of practitioners, usually through physical and psychological abuse in detention. In a preface to an anti-Falun Gong book published in 2009, Zheng wrote, "'Falun Gong' and similar evil religions are like viruses corroding the organism of humanity, warping the souls of believers, destroying social order, disrupting economic development, and have become a public nuisance to mankind and a cancer on society."<sup>211 212 213</sup>

Zheng's 340-bed hepatopancreatobiliary department at the First Affiliated Hospital of Zhejiang University, including three dedicated transplant wards, claimed to be the largest transplant center in eastern China.<sup>214</sup> Zheng performed 5 liver transplants in one day on January 28, 2005 and a total of 11 that week; this took place when China did not have an organ donation system.<sup>215</sup> As of October 2017, he had performed over 2,200 liver transplants.<sup>216</sup>

On February 8, 2015, Tan Yunshan, director of the liver disease department at Zhongshan Hospital of Fudan University, told an overseas reporter, "All the donor livers are directly extracted at the source. Because we do the extraction ourselves and have access to the original information about the donor organ, we would know for sure whether a donor liver can be used or not..."<sup>217</sup>

When asked whether the hospital used organs from Falun Gong practitioners, Tan answered, "We don't care whether it's from a Falun Gong practitioner or not. We don't get involved in politics. As doctors, we only care about the donor liver, about whether it meets the requirements of transplantation. If it meets the requirements, we don't care who it's from."

### 3. Key Party, Government, and Military Agencies


As discussed earlier, China conducts organ transplants on a far larger scale than it officially claims. The internationally promoted "Chinese mode" of organ donation is used as a façade to hide the continued killing of prisoners of conscience as part of a larger eradication campaign. Behind the scenes, the CCP has mobilized the entire state apparatus to carry out its campaign against Falun Gong. Below are the roles of the main party, government, and military agencies involved, as ascertained by a combination of public information and insiders' testimonies and admissions.

The 610 Office and the Political and Legal Affairs Committee have the power to control personnel and resources under more than 20 Communist Party and government agencies and organizations, such as the Ministry of Public Security (police system), Ministry of State Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, various propaganda departments, and the fields of finance, education, science and technology, and health throughout the country.<sup>218</sup> It orchestrates and drives the eradication campaign against Falun Gong and directs organ harvesting activities within that contexts.

The Ministry of Health and its successor, the National Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC), have been fully responsible for the overall planning, policy making, regulation and management of China's transplant industry and its organ donation and allocation system.<sup>219</sup>

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is one of the few militaries in the world that belongs to a political party rather than the state. Jiang Zemin authorized the General Logistics Department to serve as the core unit to lead every level of the military to eradicate the practice of Falun Gong. The military was given the power to manage and oversee secret detention facilities and concentration camps, to supervise organ procurement as well as to dispatch organ sources (living "donors").<sup>220</sup>

Over 1,000 civilian and PLA and Armed Police Force hospitals in mainland China have been involved in organ transplantation.<sup>221 222</sup>



In March 2013, at the Twelfth National People's Congress, the former Ministry of Health was dissolved, and Huang Jiefu was relieved of his position as Deputy Minister of Health. Meanwhile, the new National Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC) was founded.<sup>223</sup> One year later, the National Organ Donation and Transplantation Committee (NODTC) was established and Huang Jiefu was named the committee's chairman.<sup>224</sup> Even though the committee declared that it would function as a central management unit to guide and oversee the organ transplant and donation system in China, it is not a government agency. This structure potentially allows the Chinese regime to avoid criminal liability and future prosecution for transplant abuses.

Even though Huang Jiefu is internationally recognized as the spokesperson for China's transplant industry, according to government records, he no longer holds a government position.<sup>225</sup> Huang's announcement that China discontinued the use of organs from death-row prisoners after January 1, 2015 cannot be traced to any officially promulgated policy statements or laws, and it has no legal effect. The State Council's *Human Organ Transplant Ordinance*, promulgated on March 21, 2007,<sup>226</sup> did not abolish the Provisional Regulations of 1984 that allow the sourcing of organs from prisoners. The 1984 Provisional Regulations remain in force today.

## 4. Financial Gain

A reform in China's health system that began in the 1990s forced hospitals to chase profits to survive. Transplantation, a new service that is not covered by price controls and requires ongoing use of anti-rejection drugs, became a primary way for hospitals in China to make money.<sup>227</sup>

*Guangzhou Southern Weekend* reported in March 2010 that since 2000, the sale of organs for transplants has become "a mine of high-grade ore that can't be exhausted."<sup>228</sup>

Dong Jiahong, director of the hepatobiliary surgery department at Beijing Tsinghua Chang Gung Hospital, revealed to Xinhua News Agency in October 2014, "For a liver cancer patient, an average liver resection may cost 20,000 to 30,000 RMB. Liver transplantation may cost over 200,000 RMB, and there are follow-up costs each year."<sup>229</sup> Prescribing immunosuppressant pharmaceuticals also provide doctors with a source of kickbacks.

As of 2007, the website of the China International Transplant Network Assistance Center (CITNAC)<sup>230</sup> listed transplant prices for foreigners. Kidney transplants cost more than \$65,000 USD, liver transplants were \$130,000, and lung and heart transplants each cost around \$150,000.<sup>231</sup>

An on-site investigation by TV Chosun in October 2017 found that the regular kidney transplant cost for Korean patients at Tianjin Central Hospital was 120 million to 140 million South Korean won (about 900,000 RMB or \$120,000 USD). An additional donation of 100,000 RMB (about 15 million won or \$13,000 USD) could expedite the transplant from weeks to days.<sup>232</sup>

Huang Jiefu publicly stated in May 2007, "China is one of the cheapest countries in the world for organ transplants. Liver transplants [cost] about 1/10 of those in the U.S., and for kidney transplants it is about the same ratio [1/10]."<sup>233</sup>

However, transplant fees are not always low and depend on recipients' urgency and ability to pay. For example, in 2014 and 2015, Yang Guang, an expert in Chinese domestic affairs who resides in Denmark, revealed the inside stories of two hospitals affiliated with a medical university in northeastern China where organ transplant prices for foreigners are not fixed. Usually, the hospitals charged \$500,000 to \$1 million USD. In some cases, those with money, desperate for organs, have been charged up to \$2 million USD for a transplant and hospital stay. A Japanese woman who received a young girl's liver was charged \$5 million USD.<sup>234</sup>

The website of the Organ Transplant Center of the People's Liberation Army Hospital No. 309 in Beijing openly stated, "Our Organ Transplant Center is our main revenue source. Its gross income in 2003 was 16,070,000 RMB. From January to June of 2004, income was 13,570,000 RMB. This year (2004) there is a chance to break through 30,000,000 RMB."<sup>235</sup> Its revenue further rose from 30 million RMB in 2006 to 230 million RMB in 2010, an increase of nearly 8-fold in just four years.<sup>236</sup> This example shows that the growth in organ transplantation continued after 2006 when organ harvesting allegations first came to light.

The massive organ supply available from Falun Gong practitioners provides opportunities for hospitals and transplant professionals. The large sums patients pay for organs go not only to medical personnel and hospitals but also, in part, to those in military and legal entities who provide Falun Gong detainees. Corruption has become pervasive in China, and the killing of Falun Gong for their organs is but one example.

## 5. Global Expansion<sup>237</sup>

There is enormous demand for transplants in China. Huang Jiefu, China's top transplant official, attributed the limiting factor not to organ availability but rather to a lack of qualified hospitals and experienced doctors.<sup>238 239</sup> He announced plans in 2015 to increase the number of approved transplant hospitals from 169 to 300 and even to 500 over the next few years.<sup>240</sup> Huang declared in August 2017 that China would increase the number of approved transplant hospitals to 300 and perform the most transplants in the world by 2020.<sup>241</sup>

In addition to perpetuating inbound transplant tourism, China is seeking to make organs procured in the mainland available to residents in other regions. Huang Jiefu visited Taiwan in December 2014 to promote a "cross-strait organ exchange platform" to export organs from the mainland to Taiwan so that "patients would no longer need to travel to China to undergo transplants."<sup>242</sup>

He also promoted transplantation in China to overseas markets in August 2015, stating, "The future transplant costs in China will still be the cheapest, most accessible in the world, and of high quality."<sup>243</sup>

China has created the appearance of reform through public relations campaigns in which it presents falsified data and unimplemented plans, while dismissing evidence of state-driven systemic abuse as isolated criminal cases. That has led some international organizations to endorse the "Chinese mode" of organ donation and transplantation and renew collaboration with its transplant entities.

The China Organ Transplantation Development Foundation (COTDF) signed an organ sharing agreement with the Macau Health Bureau in November 2017 to alleviate the organ shortage there. Residents of Macau, Hong Kong, and Taiwan can register for organs through COTRS. As of December 2017, 519 Hong Kong and 50 Macau residents had received organ transplants in mainland China.<sup>244</sup>

These expansion plans are not limited to Asia. At the 2017 Chinese Transplant Conference, Huang Jiefu presented organ transplantation as part of China's "One Belt, One Road Initiative". The initiative aims to strengthen economic and political ties between China and other parts of Asia, Europe, Africa, and Oceania.<sup>245</sup> In November 2017, the Tahoe Group, which has donated 100 million RMB to the COTDF, signed a memorandum of strategic cooperation with the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center to import its leading technology and expertise in organ transplantation and other subjects.<sup>246</sup>

A 2018 study of 445 research papers on organ transplantation in China that were published in peer-reviewed English language journals between 2000 and 2017 found that more than 90% of the papers failed to meet international accepted ethical standards for publication of research involving biological material obtained from executed prisoners.<sup>247</sup>

A delegation of 150 Chinese experts took part in the July 2018 Congress of The Transplantation Society in Madrid, where some Western transplant experts endorsed China's organ donation system despite credible allegations of transplant abuses.

José Núñez, the medical director of the World Health Organization's organ donation and transplantation program, said, "International transplantation is like a boat, and for many years, China was swimming outside of the boat. Now the boat, with China jumping on board, is moving faster than ever before."<sup>248</sup> He reportedly added, "China's efforts are leading the boat's way."<sup>249</sup>

China's killing for organs and global expansion of its transplant system raise ethical challenges for governments, institutions, and individuals around the world.

## VII. Summary of Facts

Beginning in 2000, the transplant industry in China began growing exponentially and China came to perform more transplants than any other nation in just a few years despite a declining rate of death-row executions and the absence of a voluntary organ donation system.<sup>250 251 252</sup> Its transplant industry continued to grow even after the killing of prisoners of conscience for organs first drew international attention in 2006.

Based on government-imposed minimum transplant bed requirements for transplant centers, the 164 Ministry-approved transplant hospitals have the capacity to conduct more than 70,000 transplants per year. However, most of the approved hospitals exceed the government-stipulated minimum bed counts. Some have hundreds of beds dedicated to organ transplantation with bed utilization rates beyond 100%. In addition, many centers that did not receive permits continued to perform transplants after 2007. The actual number of transplants performed yearly in China is therefore likely to be much higher than the minimum system capacity of 70,000 and an order of magnitude greater than the officially cited figures of between 10,000 to 15,000 transplants per year.

Despite its claim that donations have become the sole organ source since 2015, China continues to perform transplants on demand on a scale far greater than its official figure of 15,000 per year. Additionally, large numbers of foreigners continue to travel to China for organ transplants despite official statements to the contrary.

The national organ donation and allocation system (COTRS) is used as a façade to launder illicitly obtained organs. Given the ratio of registered and actual donors in the United States, the number of registered donors in China, as of the end of 2017, would likely have yielded fewer than 29 donors in total. Furthermore, the number of reported donations from various regions, including from hospital intensive care units, also cannot support the official number of transplants, which is already understated.

Regulation has not kept pace with claimed reform. China's organ donation system and regulatory framework are still in their early stages and cannot support the number of transplants being performed in China, let alone accommodate the on-demand nature of China's transplant industry. Agencies that purportedly provide regulatory oversight for the donation system remain empty shells, and most organs

used for transplants do not, and cannot, come from the national donation and allocation system that is presented to the international community as the primary source of transplant organs in China.

An alternate source of organs must exist because voluntary donations simply cannot support the actual number of transplants performed every year. Experts acknowledge a decline in the number of criminal executions in recent years while evidence exists that organs continue to be procured systematically from prisoners of conscience via extrajudicial killings. The harvesting of organs from this source serves the Communist Party's campaign to destroy what it declared to be an "enemy of the state." It also serves the Communist Party's "United Front" efforts to gain influence with foreign dignitaries and the elite among overseas Chinese, and provides fame and financial gain with which to incentivize hospitals and doctors to participate in these killings.<sup>253</sup>

The main source of transplanted organs must be Falun Gong practitioners, who constitute the largest group of prisoners of conscience in China. The campaign to eradicate Falun Gong was ordered by the central leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, coordinated through a network of 610 Offices, and carried out through both military units and civilian government agencies, including law enforcement, the judiciary, and the penal system. The Chinese regime used political indoctrination, including incitement of hatred against Falun Gong, and the prospect of personal gain to incentivize both government officials and medical professionals to participate in the campaign. As a result, Falun Gong practitioners have been systematically imprisoned, tortured, and forcibly subjected to blood tests and other medical examinations related to organ function, both in state custody and in their homes, after which many, numbering in the hundreds of thousands, have simply disappeared.

The regime has also intensified its persecution of other faith groups, including Uyghur Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, and House Christians. More than one million Uyghurs are now detained in political reeducation camps in Xinjiang and subjected to similar "transformation" techniques as those used on Falun Gong. They have been forcibly blood tested, given other medical examinations, and had DNA data collected. The Communist Party is now expanding its targets for reeducation campaigns, surveillance, and organ harvesting to exploit much larger populations across China.

China is expanding its transplant system outside its borders and is seeking to redefine its role as a global leader through organ sharing agreements and other forms of engagement with international parties by Chinese transplant hospitals and personnel, including academic collaboration, commercial transactions, and transplant tourism.

## VIII. Legal Analysis

### 1. Genocide

Article II of the United Nations' Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) defines genocide as follows:<sup>254</sup>

"In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

To conclude that genocide has been committed requires showing that a protected group was targeted, that one or more of the prohibited acts were taken against members of the group, and that the acts were committed with an intent to destroy the protected the group as such, in whole or in part.

This analysis finds it beyond reasonable doubt that the campaign of eradication against Falun Gong practitioners since 1999 constitutes genocide under the Genocide Convention.

#### a) Categorization and Targeting of Falun Gong as a Religious Group

The Chinese regime’s policy of forced conversion without exception expressly targets Falun Gong as a religious group as the “transformation” program requires that practitioners publicly renounce their spiritual beliefs, surrender texts and other materials related to those beliefs, and participate in the forcible conversion of other practitioners. As exemplified by the transformation standards developed at Masanjia, whether a Falun Gong practitioner is released or tortured depends entirely upon the renunciation of his or her spiritual faith rather than elements connected to any crimes or behavior in custody.

#### b) Acts of Genocide

Firsthand testimonies and authoritative reports both demonstrate that the “transformation” process includes the systematic application of physical and psychological torture. This torture has caused the deaths of at least 4,258 practitioners (verified cases with identities).<sup>255</sup> Prison officials were empowered by Jiang Zemin’s directive that “Beating them to death is nothing ... If they die, it counts as suicide,” to be entirely unrestrained in their use of even lethal force when transforming Falun Gong practitioners. Furthermore, the regime authorizes all levels of the 610 Office, prisons, labor camps, mental hospitals, brainwashing centers, and black jails to use drugs to disorient, disable, and even kill Falun Gong practitioners.

The Chinese regime has also extrajudicially killed Falun Gong practitioners for organ harvesting on a large scale as part of a state-driven campaign to eliminate Falun Gong.

Among the acts of genocide, our analysis finds that the Chinese regime has satisfied the Convention’s subsections of (a) “Killing members of the group” and (b) “Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group.”

#### c) Intent to Destroy Falun Gong

The Chinese regime’s intent to destroy Falun Gong is clear from both its directives and its actions. It indicated its intent to destroy the group as a whole through its policy to “transform” all practitioners

by sending them to brainwashing facilities “with absolutely no exceptions.” This policy leaves each member of the group with two options: to cease being part of the group by renouncing their sincerely held religious beliefs against their conscience or to be physically destroyed through torture and potential organ harvesting.

The directive from the highest level of the regime was to ruin their reputations, bankrupt them financially, and destroy them physically. The last component, physical destruction, has been carried out through the Chinese law enforcement system by torturing Falun Gong practitioners to death and killing them through the administration of nerve, organ, and/or brain-damaging drugs. It has also been carried out through the Chinese medical system by harvesting the organs of Falun Gong practitioners to supply the rapacious demands of the Chinese organ transplant industry.

The Chinese regime has deliberately incited hatred against Falun Gong through media channels and direct intervention in workplaces and schools. As a result, much of the public, including Falun Gong practitioners’ families and friends, turn a blind eye to the brutalities committed against practitioners and, in many cases, even participate actively in carrying out the persecution on behalf of the communist regime.

Derogatory writings published by transplantation leaders Huang Jiefu and Zheng Shusen are manifestations of a propaganda campaign so pervasive that, even within the medical field, doctors and other personnel were driven to participate in the regime’s campaign to eradicate Falun Gong. Similar language can be found in propaganda used by the Nazi regime to justify its persecution of the Jews in the Holocaust.

As shown by the statements of top Communist Party leaders, police officers who carry out the transformation and torture of practitioners, as well as leading transplant doctors, the actions taken by the Chinese regime against Falun Gong practitioners, including physical and psychological torture, forced injections of nerve-damaging drugs, and killing for organs, are done with the intent to physically destroy the religious group.

#### d) Conclusion

In effect, the Chinese regime’s policy forces practitioners to make a choice between (1) giving up their religious beliefs or (2) sustaining endless torture, the administration of nerve-damaging drugs, or even being killed for organs. For a devout Falun Gong practitioner, renouncing one’s faith means spiritual death, while persevering in one’s belief, given the persecution, likely leads to physical elimination. From both perspectives, the Chinese regime has attempted to systematically annihilate Falun Gong.

## 2. Crimes Against Humanity

Under international law, the determination as to whether crimes against humanity have been committed requires the existence of certain contextual elements and the performance of certain prohibited acts.

The required contextual elements are (1) a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, (2) a nexus between the prohibited acts and the attack, and (3) knowledge of the attack by the accused. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court also requires that the attack be “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy.”

The acts prohibited by all three United Nations statutes defining crimes against humanity are:<sup>256 257 258</sup>

- (a) murder;
- (b) extermination;
- (c) enslavement;
- (d) deportation;
- (e) imprisonment;
- (f) torture;
- (g) rape;
- (h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; and
- (i) other inhumane acts.

This analysis finds it beyond reasonable doubt that the Chinese regime’s eradication campaign against Falun Gong has satisfied all of the elements that constitute crimes against humanity.

#### a) A Widespread or Systematic Attack Directed Against a Civilian Population

The Chinese regime’s imprisonment, torture, murder, persecution, and other acts against Falun Gong practitioners have been well-documented since the eradication campaign began in 1999. It has also been made clear in the Communist Party’s own directives that the attack was directed against a civilian population (Falun Gong practitioners).

The facts show that the attack is widespread in geography, frequency, and number of victims. Before the official start of the campaign, Jiang Zemin directed that “all ministries, all provinces, and all cities” cooperate closely with the 610 Office. Indeed, Falun Gong practitioners have been arrested and imprisoned for their faith in every province, municipality and autonomous region across China. Millions of practitioners across China have been detained for their faith, and over four thousand have been confirmed to have died as a direct result of the persecution.

The attack is also systematic. It was orchestrated directly by top Communist Party leadership and carried out through an organized structure of government agencies, including the 610 Office, the Political and Legal Affairs Committee, various ministries, law enforcement agencies, the judiciary, and the military. The 610 Office established standard procedures (e.g. the Masanjia transformation standards) and transmitted its directives through its chain of command to be implemented by local personnel. It also oversees the entire transformation process of practitioners, from monitoring to apprehension, incarceration, and brainwashing.

#### b) Knowledge of and Nexus for the Attack

Because of the centrally controlled nature of the campaign, the Communist Party’s authorized agents, including police officers and judges, carried out the prohibited acts against Falun Gong practitioners with full knowledge of the regime’s attack on the group and its intention to eradicate the group.

Some police officers told practitioners during torture that they intended to “make [Falun Gong practitioners’] lives worse than death” or made similar remarks that indicated knowledge of the communist regime’s overall attack and their own roles within the campaign. Other officers, even if they did not derive personal enjoyment from the act, were compelled to arrest practitioners because their jobs were threatened otherwise. Similarly, doctors who participated in the forced administration of nerve-damaging drugs have admitted to carrying out the acts in violation of medical ethics because their jobs were threatened if they failed to complete the “political task.”

Furthermore, because free practice of religion is a constitutionally protected right in China and the practice of Falun Gong is not prohibited by law, law enforcement and judicial officials would have no reason to arrest or prosecute Falun Gong practitioners on account of their religious belief in the course of their official duties other than to carry out the regime’s attack on Falun Gong.

### c) State and Organizational Policy

The attack carried out on Falun Gong practitioners is the result of directives issued by the central Communist Party leadership, including its policy of “transforming” all practitioners without exception and through any means necessary, its policy of impunity and even rewards for police officers who caused the deaths of practitioners in their charge. The directives aim to ruin the reputations of Falun Gong practitioners, bankrupt them financially, and destroy them physically. The 610 Office has also actively promoted torture methods and other prohibited acts across detention facilities for use against Falun Gong practitioners.

The state has also perpetuated the killing of prisoners of conscience for organs by funding and otherwise promoting the industrialization of organ transplantation without attempting to build an organ donation and allocation system that would have been required for the ethical sourcing of organs.

### d) Commission of Underlying Prohibited Acts

Since the Chinese regime began its campaign to eradicate Falun Gong, it has systematically confined and abused practitioners in police stations, detention centers, black jails, prisons, forced labor camps, mental hospitals, brainwashing centers, and other facilities. Widespread accounts of torture have been thoroughly documented both within this document and in other reports, including rape and sexual abuse by prison authorities and by inmates instigated by the authorities. It has also been concluded that the Chinese regime has killed large numbers of Falun Gong practitioners for the purpose of organ procurement.

Through a combination of its “transformation” campaign and organ harvesting practices, the Chinese regime has committed, at a minimum, acts of (a) murder, (b) extermination, (c) enslavement, (e) imprisonment, (f) torture, (g) rape, (h) persecution, and (i) other inhumane acts against Falun Gong practitioners as part of its attack on the group.

### e) Conclusion

Our analysis finds it beyond reasonable doubt that crimes against humanity have been committed by the Chinese communist regime against Falun Gong.

## IX. Recommendations

“The wrongs  
which we seek to  
condemn and punish  
have been  
so calculated,  
so malignant, and  
so devastating, that  
civilization cannot tolerate  
their being ignored,  
because it cannot survive  
their being repeated.”

—*U.S. Chief Justice  
Robert H. Jackson before the  
International Military Tribunal  
at the Nuremberg Trials*

Based on the facts and analysis presented in this report, COHRC urges:

1. Heads of state and national legislatures to issue statements to condemn and call for an end to the persecution and organ harvesting organs of Falun Gong practitioners and other prisoners of conscience by the Chinese communist regime; and call upon the Chinese government to allow international investigators to conduct independent inspections of transplant facilities, registry data, and organ donation records.
2. National governments to prohibit citizens’ travel to other countries to receive organs from illegal or unidentified sources, as well as prohibit financial reimbursement for such transplants and postoperative care, so as to prevent their citizens from unwittingly becoming complicit in this genocide.
3. National governments to (i) seek resolutions in the United Nations and the European Union condemning organ transplant abuse involving prisoners of conscience, (ii) urge member states to adopt legislation consistent with the Declaration of Istanbul.<sup>259</sup>
4. National governments to recommend sanctions for individuals involved in the harvesting of organs or tissues from prisoners of conscience or other involuntary donors.
5. Health departments to fund education and awareness initiatives to inform the public of the medical and ethical risks of going abroad for organ transplants.
6. Health care providers to educate potential transplant recipients on the medical, ethical, and legal risks of traveling abroad to receive an organ transplant in another country, including known cases of governments engaging in organ procurement from executed prisoners and/or prisoners of conscience.
7. Medical and academic institutions, professional associations, and commercial entities to condition interaction and transactions with Chinese transplant programs on more stringent monitoring and enforcement of ethical standards.
8. International organizations, including the United Nations and the World Health Organization, to facilitate independent investigations into organ procurement practices in China.

## Appendix I: Summaries of Reported Cases and Testimonies from Relatives of Victims

The victims in the cases below were all Falun Gong practitioners. The full documentation for each case is available separately online.

### 1. He Xiuling (贺秀玲): suspected victim of live organ harvesting Female, age 52, Yantai City, Shandong Province



*He Xiuling*

He Xiuling refused to renounce Falun Gong and was persecuted to the verge of death by Yantai Nanjiao Detention Center as a result. She was taken to Yantai Yuhuangding Hospital on March 8, 2004. On the morning of March 11, the head of the Zhifu District 610 Office in Yantai (surnamed Li) notified He's husband, Xu Chengben, by phone that his wife had died.

When He's relatives arrived at the hospital mortuary, her hands and feet were warm, her left eye was visibly sunken and purple-black, and a bandage was wrapped around her waist. When the relatives yelled out, trails of tears flowed from her eyes. Seeing that she was still alive, her family rushed to find doctors, who did not respond. Only after persistent pleas did doctors bring an electrocardiograph to the mortuary. The instrument revealed that He's heart was still beating. When the electrocardiogram printout reached between ten and twenty centimeters long, a doctor hurriedly tore it up and left. He's relatives pleaded with doctors to save her,

but no one commenced resuscitation. The next day, her relatives were not allowed to see her. On the third day, March 13, when He's relatives were allowed to see her again, she no longer had a pulse, and her hands and feet were cold, confirming that she had died.

Suspecting that He's kidney had been taken away before she was moved to the mortuary while still breathing, the husband preserved her body and escalated the case to higher authorities. Police offered Xu 100,000 RMB to drop his case. He refused. Two years later, he made a posting online to voice suspicion that his wife was a victim of live organ harvesting. The next day, he and He's sister were arrested, and He's body was soon cremated. When Xu was released from a brainwashing center, he was skin and bones; his weight had dropped from its original 187 pounds to just over 110 pounds. He was often semi-conscious and disoriented. He had given up his faith and dropped the case of his wife's death. Xu died suddenly in February 2008; the medical examiner reported that he had died of poisoning. (See [Full case documentation](#)<sup>260</sup>)

## 2. Zhang Zhenggang (张正刚), suspected victim of live organ harvesting Male, age 36, Huai'an City, Jiangsu Province



*Zhang Zhenggang with his wife and daughter*

Zhang Zhenggang was an employee of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and a volunteer assistant of a Falun Gong practice site in Huai'an. Staff from the Huai'an Public Security Bureau arrested and detained him from March 2 to 25, 2000. He was severely beaten by officers on the morning of March 25 and suffered serious head injuries. He was rushed to Huai'an First People's Hospital at around 8 am, where doctors performed a craniotomy and gave him oxygen and intravenous injections. He was in a coma but had a heartbeat and blood pressure.

His wife and mother rushed to the hospital and stayed by his side. However, his treatment plan, medical history, and medication status were withheld by police, who were monitoring the entire ward. Doctors performed an electrocardiogram on March 30 at 6:30pm, at which time Zhang was still in a coma, his heartbeat was weak, and he was breathing.

Agents from the 610 Office met and called in forty to fifty police officers, who took control of the hospital corridors and patient ward.

Officers told his wife and mother that they needed to discuss Zhang's declaration of death, thereby taking them out of the room and forcibly separating them from Zhang. Officers forced doctors to remove Zhang's oxygen and IV tube. Zhang was then injected with a drug. The officers rushed forward, pushed Zhang's other relatives and spectators out of the way, and took Zhang away, claiming to be taking him to a crematorium. An autopsy was performed on Zhang's body without his family's consent or presence.

The next day, Zhang's wife, daughter, mother, and other relatives went to the crematorium to see his body. They were obstructed en route by police officers, who pushed and shoved them. Under pressure from spectators who had gathered at the scene, the officers relented and allowed the family to mourn Zhang at the crematorium. The entire process was directed and monitored by the Huai'an police department. The police did not allow relatives to ask questions, express condolences, lay a wreath, or petition higher authorities. (See [full case documentation](#)<sup>261</sup>)

## Appendix II: Witness Testimonies

The first-hand testimonies below are from witnesses of historic events, survivors of torture in China who were detained for their religious beliefs, as well as relatives of suspected organ harvesting victims and other missing persons. (Watch [samples of video testimonies](#)<sup>262</sup>) The full testimony videos will be made available separately. Testimonies of survivors who escaped organ harvesting are also available upon request; they are omitted from this report for security reasons.

### 1. Li Baigen (李百根), former deputy director of the Beijing Exploration and Design Management Department



*Li Baigen*

My name is Baigen Li (李百根). I served as a regimental-level colonel in the Second Artillery Force of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). In 1997, I left the PLA and joined the Capital Planning Commission as the deputy director of the Beijing Exploration and Design Management Department.

On November 26, 1999, 4 months after the CCP started its campaign against Falun Gong, a “Falun Gong Situation Report Meeting” was held in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. The meeting was attended by over 3,000 high-ranking officials from the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CCP, Work Committee for Offices Directly Under the Central Committee of the CCP, State Organs Work Committee of the CCP, military units stationed in Beijing, and the Beijing CCP Committee. Among the attendees were military commanders at or above the division level, central-level CCP officials, and Beijing municipal bureau-level officials. The meeting was hosted by Li Lanqing, Ding Guangen, and Luo Gan.

Li Lanqing, then-member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee and head of the CCP's Central Leading Group for Handling the Falun Gong Issue, gave a speech titled “Several Problems in the Struggle Against Falun Gong.” I was in the meeting. Even though my rank did not qualify me to attend the meeting, the supervisor of my work unit forced me to attend so that I could be “educated” because I had publicly admitted that I would continue to practice Falun Gong.

In that meeting, I heard Li Lanqing said that since the start of the persecution of Falun Gong on July 20, Falun Gong practitioners had kept coming to Beijing to appeal. Li also said that from then on, the persecution must be intensified and must “destroy them politically, bankrupt them financially, ruin their reputation.” These sentences were not recorded in the meeting minutes and were communicated only verbally.

The description above is based on my personal experience.

*Baigen Li*  
*3/27/2019*

Baigen Li  
March 27, 2019

## 2. Zhang Yijie (张亦洁), former official of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation



*Zhang Yijie*

My name is Zhang Yijie (张亦洁). I worked in the Ministry of Foreign Economic Liaison, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) (which is now the Ministry of Commerce), and the Chinese Embassy in Romania. After returning to China from Romania, I continued to work at MOFTEC.

I began practicing Falun Dafa at the end of 1994. My illnesses were healed after I practiced the meditation exercises, read the books, and assimilated to the principles of Truthfulness-Compassion-Forbearance. I was energetic and in good spirits. I no longer worried about gain or loss and was kind to those around me, including those who harmed me. I felt very blessed to be able to cultivate Falun Dafa.

In July 1999, the Chinese government, led by Jiang Zemin, launched the persecution of Falun

Dafa practitioners based on a policy to bankrupt them financially, defame their reputations, and destroy them physically. It did so to force all the practitioners to stop practicing Falun Gong. I persisted in my belief in Truthfulness, Compassion and Forbearance, and I told people of the benefits Falun Gong brought to society and how the government's persecution of it was wrong. As a result, I was removed from all government positions and expelled from the party. I was unlawfully imprisoned or detained seven times, and during these seven years I was severely tortured, including being deprived of sleep for 42 consecutive days. Police officers and others who beat me said, "If you don't transform, we will make living worse than death for you! You won't die but will live and suffer!"

My husband and I were both government officials. He worked as the Director-General and Counselor for the European Region of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. He worked on trade affairs between China and Eastern Europe. He also worked on policymaking and was the Secretary of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. Only because I refused to give up my faith, he was limited in his duties. MOFTEC threatened me countless times with the careers of my husband and my children. They also threatened divorce, severance of relationships, dismissal, and other actions. The long-time monitoring and surveillance, cutting off of finances, incarceration, and separation destroyed my once happy, peaceful and wealthy family.

In March 2001, Li Lanqing, then-head of the Central Leading Group for Handling the Falun Gong Issue, had me put in a labor camp for one and a half years. Because I still persisted in my belief and refused to transform, they added another ten months to my sentence. When I was released in 2003, I lost my vision for a period of time, my waist and knees were severely injured, my hair turned completely white, my mind slowed down, and I could not speak fluently.

The following are excerpts of my own experiences in the labor camp from March 2001 and July 2003.

## **42 Days of “Training the Eagle” (Sleep Deprivation)**

Because I refused to write the “four letters” (a guarantee not to practice Falun Gong, an admission of guilt and wrongdoing, a document of separation from Falun Gong, and a denunciation), the labor camp first deprived me of sleep for 18 days. They began brainwashing me using one person after another. They forced me to listen to audio recordings slandering Dafa. They used many ways to try to manipulate my mind. Meanwhile, they also beat and humiliated me. I went through those 18 days of suffering with a strong faith in Dafa.

After the 18-day campaign failed to yield results, I was again thrown into an isolation room from November 8 to December 20, 2001. Nine people, including police officers, drug addicts, prostitutes, and transformed practitioners (called “Judas”) took turns around the clock to ensure that I did not touch the wall or fall asleep. Under this tight monitoring, I was also tortured in many different ways and forced to stand for 42 days. As soon as I fell asleep, they would beat me with a stick, pour cold water down my shirt collar, or strip off my outer clothes and freeze me in the cold weather. I was given only a small piece of corn bread each meal and not allowed to drink water. As I went to the restroom, I tried wash my face so I could drink a little water. After they found out, I was not allowed to wash myself or go to the restroom. I became incontinent as a result. I was then pushed onto the ground into urine. After more than 30 days, I was starved and exhausted. My consciousness drifted, and I hit a wall and fell to the ground. Police officers brought in basin after basin of cold water and poured it on me. The freezing water caused me to awaken. I was completely soaked and shivering. When I asked for a change of clothes, the officers would not allow it unless I agreed to transform. I stood back up while shivering. From morning until night, from night until morning, one day after another, I fell and froze while being soaked. I was sleepy, starving, and thirsty. I dried out several layers of pants using my body temperature. I faced death over and over again during those 42 days.

## **Between Life and Death**

After 42 days, they continued to torture me because I persisted in my belief.

Four drug-addict prostitutes tried to force me to write the “four letters,” but I refused. One of them was Huang Ping. She kicked me, sending me crashing into an opposite wall. It took me a while to recover and stand up. Huang Ping yelled, “[Are you going to] write it or not?!” I said, “No!” She kicked me again. I backed up into the wall and fell. In pain, I struggled and curled myself up. “Get up! Get up! Will you write it or not?” “No!” I replied in a weak but firm voice and struggled to stand up. She kicked me again and again, making me roll on the floor. She kicked me in the ribs, chest, and all over my abdomen. I said nothing. When I fell, I struggled to stand up. I would then be kicked down again, and then I would stand up, and so on.

She went crazy and started breathing heavily. She grabbed my hair and yelled, “Write it or not?! Write it or not?! Write it or not...” She kicked me in the lower body. I was again sent flying into the wall and fell. She then focused her kicks toward my lower body. When I could not stand up again, they kicked at my knees, chest, back, stomach, and private parts at the same time, like a sandbag. I finally could bear no more and felt a warm wave surge from my chest. I lay on the ground face-up, lost consciousness, and went into shock.

They dragged me to an empty room. I had bleeding beneath the skin on my chest, back, entire waist, abdomen, and lower body down to my knees for days. In addition to being bloody, bruised, and swollen all over, I had internal injuries that were not visible from the outside. It was difficult for me to move, and I was secretly detained there for 17 days. If I died and was dragged away, no one would have known.

With a strong belief in Falun Dafa, I once again came back from the verge of death.

### **Release from Bondage**

With my one-and-a-half-year labor camp term, I was supposed to be released in September 2002. However, the police wanted to make me suffer more, so they claimed that I went against transformation and illegally extended my term by ten months. In July 2003, I finally walked out of the labor camp with pain and suffering all over but alive.

After leaving the labor camp, I was monitored by both my workplace and residential committee. When I went to work, the security guard downstairs would forcibly stop me from getting on the bus. I was secretly followed for long periods of time and openly followed during the CCP’s politically sensitive days. Security at my workplace even placed a table in the hallway to monitor me for eight hours a day. My workplace did not give me work to do, but I had to go to work every day to be monitored. My vacation days were revoked, and I was not allowed to visit my parents in my hometown. I was ordered not to travel outside of Beijing. The Beijing Public Security Bureau sent people to open my office desk drawers and illegally search them.

In September 2006, to expose and counter the persecution and to speak out to the international community, I went out alone. In ten days, I crossed three countries and arrived in Thailand after much hardship and danger. In October 2007, I arrived in the United States with assistance from many kind people.

### **Abnormal Blood Sampling and Examinations**

After the persecution began in 1999, many Falun Gong practitioners were put into detention centers, labor camps, and prisons. They had blood samples taken and were put through physical examinations frequently and abnormally. Wherever I was detained, the examinations and blood sampling followed.

In May 2000, I went to the State Council Appeals Office to petition. I was kidnapped and taken to the Chaoyang District Detention Center. Within those 20 days of detention, I was put through a blood test. The police lined up all the Falun Gong practitioners in the detention center unit and went down the line, drawing blood. Before drawing blood, they forcibly took our fingerprints and the handprints for filing.

In May 2001, at the dispatch center for labor camp personnel, I was again forcibly blood tested, given chest X-rays, an eye examination, and a gynecological examination. Because I refused the examinations and did not cooperate, I was savagely beaten and locked in a cell. At the Beijing Women's Forced Labor Camp, we were blood tested a few times. Each time, the amount of blood drawn was far more than that used for a normal physical examination at a hospital. One time in 2003, when some practitioners I didn't know and I were taken to a nearby hospital for physical examinations and chest X-rays, we were forced to bow our heads and were even forbidden to look at people around us.

In the detention center and the labor camp, only Falun Gong practitioners were given blood tests and physical examinations. The drug addicts, prostitutes, and other criminals did not have blood drawn. We did not understand why those people were not given examinations even though they had a lot of illnesses. There was an inmate named Huang Jing who monitored me 24 hours a day. She always had a stomachache, but the police never took her to the hospital. The painkillers she took were provided by her family. She struggled for nine months. After she was released, she received an examination in a hospital and was diagnosed with late-stage cervical cancer.

The crime of organ harvesting by the Chinese government was exposed in 2006. Many questions I had had for a long time were answered. There are such horrible crimes hidden in these prisons and labor camps!

*Yi jie Zhang*    张一洁

Zhang Yijie  
November 2018

### 3. Zhang Zhongyu (张忠余), former vice chief journal editor



Zhang Zhongyu

I began to practice Falun Gong in May 1996 while working as the Vice Director of the Organization Department of the Luohe Municipal Committee in Jilin Province. I used Falun Dafa's principles of truthfulness, compassion and forbearance to regulate my words and deeds. I worked hard and was promoted to Vice Chief Editor of the Provincial Secondary Journal (equivalent to vice director of a provincially directed agency). This was when the eradication persecution of Falun Gong began. Between the end of 1999 and 2007, because I persisted in practicing Falun Gong and exposing the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) persecution, I was unlawfully kidnapped more than 10 times. After experiencing inhumane torture and nearing the brink of death, I managed to go overseas. The following are excerpts of my own experiences from the persecution.

#### **I acknowledged the eradication order from Jiang Zemin through the police**

On July 20, 1999, the CCP began its persecution of Falun Gong. Its policies were: "Party members are prohibited from practicing Falun Gong" and "100% transformation (renouncing the practice) with absolutely no exceptions." Almost all Falun Gong practitioners who persisted in their belief and dared to expose the facts of the persecution suffered inhumane torture. I was not exempt even though I was a government official.

Though I was viewed as having a promising official career, I was forced to make a decision: "listen to and follow the party" or continue with my practice and face the "three terminations and one detention" (being expelled from the party, removed from official posts, terminated from one's job, and detained). Because I chose not to give up my faith in "truthfulness, compassion, forbearance," went to Beijing to petition for justice for Falun Gong, and distributed flyers about the persecution of Falun Gong, I was subjected to the "three terminations and one detention." I was illegally detained and tortured multiple times.

One of them was in September 2001, when CCP police mass-arrested Falun Gong practitioners in Changchun for printing and distributing Falun Gong information. Seven or eight police officers broke into our rented material printing site. The leader of that team was Li Shichang, then-vice director of the No.1 Division of the Municipal Public Security Bureau in Changchun. Throughout the entire process, there were officers pointing pistols at the three of us who were being kidnapped.

I was covered with a black hood and taken directly to a secret interrogation room on the outskirts of the No.1 Division of the Changchun Public Security Bureau. I was confined to an “iron chair” (a type of torture instrument). Maybe it was because of my background, but they showed some hesitation in the beginning. A few police officers surrounded me without starting the torture, while someone was making a phone call outside. After more than an hour, an officer rushed into the interrogation room and told the people standing around me, “I asked for instructions. Jiang Zemin already said, ‘Beating them to death is nothing. If they are disabled from the beating, it counts as their injuring themselves. If they die, it counts as suicide!’” As soon as his words fell, these plainclothes officers came at me and tortured me like crazy. This lasted a few days.

The officers used high-voltage electric batons to shock my entire body, especially my sensitive parts and genitals. When they shocked my genitals, my penis immediately turned into a carrot shape. One officer with the surname Jiang continuously shocked my lower back and made me shake uncontrollably. The officer even sneered and said, “He is very sensitive!” They covered my head with plastic bags one layer after another, almost suffocating me. They put a metal bucket on my head, beat it with a club, and lit a few cigarettes to add smoke to the interior. They cuffed my hands behind my back and repeatedly tried to forcibly rotate my arms from the back to the front of my body...

My face and body were burned black by the electric batons. The scars left on my wrists, lower back, and other areas are clearly visible even to this day.

### **The killing quota in the CCP’s prisons**

During my detention, I often heard the CCP’s police and head prisoners saying that the quota for abnormal deaths in municipal detention centers, prisons and affiliated hospitals was four people annually. However, after the persecution of Falun Gong began, with Jiang Zemin’s eradication directive, they felt free to beat Falun Gong practitioners to death when forcing them to renounce their belief. They just provided arbitrarily explanations, such as sudden heart attack, etc. By doing so, these death cases were no longer included in the quota. Therefore, they could do whatever they want to force practitioners to give up their belief.

During the month when I was in the prison hospital at the end of 2003, three practitioners who shared a room with me passed away while their hands and legs were cuffed to the bed all day and night. They were not allowed to go to the toilet. In the end, they were not given any food or water. They wasted away until they died in their urine and feces.

When I was uncuffed and unmonitored, I crawled over to one of them and fed him powdered milk that had been brought in by family a few times. I saw some life return to his dim eyes. But I was caught by a nurse, who confiscated my milk. In the end, I watched this fellow practitioner starve to death.

For another fellow practitioner who was on the verge of death but still alive, the “doctor” did not come to heal him. Rather, after hastily using his stethoscope to listen to the heartbeat, he threw his stethoscope behind his neck (this was a signal). The surrounding prisoner-nurses (prisoners acting as nurses) immediately came up and stuffed medical cotton into the practitioner’s mouth, nose, and ears

before carrying him out of the wardroom. I never saw him again and only heard the prisoner-nurses say that he died.

There were medical, surgical, infectious and female departments in the hospital, and each department had five or six wards. Each ward had eight to ten beds. Among the practitioners that I knew, Wang Kefei, Wang Yuhuan, and Liu Chengjun passed away in the hospital because of the persecution. A larger city would have at least four detention centers, as well as shelters, drug rehabilitation centers, prison hospitals, public security hospitals, mental health hospitals, juvenile correctional institutions, women's labor camps, women's prisons, and legal education classes (brainwashing classes) and several other labor camps. From 1999 to 2009, just among those I knew, there were more than 20 Falun Gong practitioners who were persecuted to death.

### **The evidence for organ harvesting**

Each time I almost died, I was sent to the central hospital of the Provincial Prison Administration in Jilin for “rescue.” During those periods, I was examined using brain CT and x-ray. My blood was sampled and tested every few days without my consent. I heard a few prisoner-nurses talking, and they said that the blood from the prisoners were used to water the flowers by the head nurse.

After it was exposed that the CCP was harvesting organs from Falun Gong practitioners, I finally realized why some deceased practitioners had sutures on their chests, why their relatives were not allowed to see the remains of their loved ones and only received a cinerary casket, and why some simply disappeared instead. I also knew why my blood was tested so frequently during the torture. As far as I know, the CCP's police are not only testing blood samples from imprisoned practitioners but also going to practitioners' homes and doing such tests. Since April 2014, there have been several reports that police from many places, such as Guizhou and Liaoning, broke into Falun Dafa practitioners' homes and took their blood samples to test their DNA. Just in the Dandong area of Liaoning province, 16 practitioners had blood samples forcibly collected by local police in September.

Some practitioners and I went on and did a related investigation. We discovered that almost all large hospitals in Changchun were doing organ transplants. The organ transplant department in the First Hospital of Jilin University even posted an organ transplant advertisement online. They claimed that their director, Fu Yaowen, managed to do more than 2,600 organ transplant operations between 1999 and 2006. After we exposed this, that organ transplant department removed the advertisement from its website.

The above testimony is based on part of my own experience in the persecution. It is just the tip of the iceberg as to how the CCP violates human rights. I promise that everything that I said is true.

zhongyu Zhang      张忠余

Zhang Zhongyu

November 2018

#### 4. Jiang Li (江莉), second daughter of suspected organ harvesting victim Jiang Xiqing (江锡清)



*Jiang Li*



*Jiang Li (back row, second from right) with her parents (front row) and siblings*

My father, Jiang Xiqing (江锡清), 65, a former cadre at the Chongqing Jiangjin District Tax Service, was illegally detained in brainwashing sessions and persecuted numerous times for refusing to renounce Falun Gong. He was arrested again on May 14, 2008 and sent to forced labor for one year at Chongqing Xishanping Labor Education Management Center.

On the afternoon of January 27, 2009, four of my family members went to see my father at the labor camp (7th unit, 2<sup>nd</sup> subunit). When we talked with him, his mental and physical health was completely normal. He also asked us not to worry about him.

At 3:40pm the next day, the labor camp called my brother Jiang Ping from an unidentified phone number. The person said, “Jiang Xiqing died at 2:40 in the afternoon” and immediately hung up.

Seven of my family members arrived at the Shijialiang Mortuary House in Chongqing at about 10:30 pm with the guidance of police officers and after some setbacks. Many police cars were parked around the mortuary, and my family members saw armed police surrounding the perimeter wall.

They took us into the mortuary and read out the regulations: 1) we could see the body for only 5 minutes, 2) no cameras, camcorders, or communications devices were allowed, and 3) we could only go to the freezer room and see Jiang Xiqing’s head (not the rest of his body).

My father was placed in a middle slot on the second freezer shelf. When my older sister saw my father's body, she yelled, "Dad! Dad!" There was no sound, so she touched his face. She found that his philtrum was still warm and saw that his upper teeth were biting his lower lip tightly. She yelled out, "My dad is still alive!"

When we heard her from outside the room, we rushed to the freezer and pulled out my father's body halfway. We touched his chest and found that it was warm. He was wearing a down jacket in the freezer, and his body temperature was higher than that of our hands. My relatives came in, all touched his body, and confirmed that it was warm. I ran out of the room and dialed 110 to call the police. A plainclothes officer at the scene said, "It's no use calling the police. Officers are here already. They won't come." My brother asked someone on site why someone who was put in a freezer for seven hours after death was still alive. A woman answered, "Regardless, we have the death certificate from the hospital." One of my relatives, Li Jia (李嘉), took three photos of my father using a digital camera. My older sister prepared to perform CPR on my father while my relatives yelled out for help to save my father.

There were many people on site. Right when we were about to inspect my father's body, we were each forcibly dragged out of the freezer room by four people. They also forcibly grabbed Li Jia's camera and deleted the three photos we took of my father's body on the floor. Uniformed and plainclothes officers pushed my father's body back into the freezer!

They demanded that we quickly sign for cremation and pay 1,000 RMB in cremation fees. We refused. They said, "We'll cremate him even if you don't sign!" We (relatives) demanded to see my father again, but they did not allow it. We never saw my father again. On February 8, 2009, they called and said that my father was autopsied and cremated.

On March 26, 2009, we received a phone call from Zhou Bailin (周柏林), the director of the Supervision Office of the First Branch of the Chongqing Procuratorate, who told us to go to the Yuxun Hotel in Beibei District in Chongqing on March 27 to hear an explanation of the autopsy report.

At the meeting on March 27, 2009, we recorded audio using a cell phone and preserved an original recording of the meeting. The recording length is 1:57:59. In the recording at 1:56:57, Zhou Bailin said, "What could be preserved are his organs, that is, all of his organs. That is to say, we preserved them to make specimens." This meant that they took out all the organs from my father—whose body was still warm when we saw him—and then cremated him without our family members' consent!

As evidenced in the complete recording, the eight labor camp officials who participated in the meeting were Zhou Bailin, Wu Xiaochang (伍晓畅), two labor camp managers surnamed Jin (金) and Hu (胡), Liu Hua (刘华), unit commander Tian Xiaohai (田晓海), Hu Yuejin (胡跃进), and meeting recorder Dong Yi (懂忆). There were more people listening in a small neighboring room. The seven participants from the Jiang family were Jiang Hong (江宏), Jiang Hongbin (江宏斌), Jiang Li (江莉), Jiang Ping (江平), Xia Buchu (夏步初), and Jiang Dehua (江德华), and Luo Kexiang (罗科祥).

We subsequently invited two lawyers from the All China Lawyers Association to seek justice for my father: Zhang Kai (张凯) from Beijing Yijia Law Firm and Li Chunfu (李春富) from Beijing Gaobo Longhua Law Firm. On May 13, 2009, the two lawyers went to my father's home in Jiangjin District of Chongqing to investigate and collect evidence. More than a hundred personnel from the Jiangjin District Public Security Bureau, Political and Legal Affairs Committee, 610 Office, domestic security police, and Jijiang Police Station surrounded the home, broke in, and beat the lawyers and my relatives. There were six people in the home at the time. The only person spared was my 76-year-old uncle who had heart disease; he personally witnessed the entire sequence of events. At around 7 o'clock in the evening, the two lawyers and my brother Jiang Hongbin were handcuffed behind their backs and marched through the streets to the police station.

Lawyer Zhang Kai was hung by his wrists in a metal cage and beaten. Lawyer Li Chunfu was also handcuffed behind his back to a stone structure at the entrance of the police station. The three were released at around 1 o'clock the next morning only after we brought attention to the incident and more than twenty lawyers from Beijing came and spoke up for Zhang and Li, filmed my uncle's testimony of events, and submitted a case to the United Nations. Li's law license was subsequently revoked. We then invited four other lawyers, who were also monitored and threatened by the authorities.

We did not stop pursuing this case. In June 2009, a person from the Chongqing Procuratorate (who did not tell us his identity or role) came to Shanghai and offered to give us 300,000 RMB to resolve my father's matter privately (requiring us to drop the matter). We refused. They then had Deputy Chief of the Shanghai Public Security Bureau Cheng Jiulong send people to my workplace and pressure my employer to terminate my job, intending to cut off my financial resources to stop me from filing a lawsuit. I worked at Shanghai Airlines and was a model employee at the time. My manager tried to protect me but was unsuccessful because my father's case was a "political issue" (a coworker told me this). In 2013, the local police in Jiangjin District found me again and told me to name a price to resolve the matter privately, but we refused.

I was terminated by my employer in 2010 only for seeking justice for my father. In the five years that followed, I went to petition in Beijing and was put in black jails numerous times and detained once. I avoided more severe persecution because I was petitioning only for my improper termination at the time, as I knew family members of victims of forced organ harvesting who were killed for seeking justice. In June 2015, I went to Beijing to submit a legal complaint against Jiang Zemin to the Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate, but they did not accept the case. Because filing lawsuits against them in China would not yield any results, I wanted to file suit in an international court, so I came to the United States.

江 莉  
JIANG LI

Jiang Li, on behalf of the Jiang family

October 31, 2018

## 5. Huang Wanqing (黄万青), brother of missing person Huang Xiong (黄雄)



*Dr. Huang Wanqing with a photo of his missing brother Huang Xiong*

Huang Xiong, male, born February 6, 1978, was a college graduate and a resident of Wan'an County, Jiangxi Province. In the summer of 1996, Huang started practicing Falun Gong in his hometown.

Just after midnight on July 20, 1999, police seized thousands of Falun Gong practitioners from their homes across China. The CCP banned Falun Gong nationwide under orders from Jiang Zemin, then General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. The next day, Huang went to Beijing to the appeal for Falun Gong practitioners who had been illegally arrested and to petition against the nationwide ban. Huang also sent information about the persecution to overseas media through the Internet and helped to distribute articles from Minghui.org to practitioners in China. As a result, he was monitored by local authorities.

On February 11, 2000, Huang visited another practitioner, Mr. Liang Chaohui, in Beijing. They were both arrested and beaten by Beijing police. Huang was then escorted back to Jiangxi Province, where he was sent to two years in Ji'an County Labor Camp. After his

release, his sister saw injuries on his foot. He didn't talk much about what he had experienced in the labor camp, but he did say that routine beatings were the norm and that the most painful part was the psychological abuse and degrading treatment he received, including being forced to attend brainwashing sessions.

In the summer of 2001, Huang was released early on bail. While out on bail, he was forced to attend brainwashing sessions at the local police station, and his personal freedom was restricted. To avoid further persecution, he left home and became homeless as he travelled from city to city, wandering the streets for almost two years.

Upon learning that Huang had left home, his other brother and sister in his hometown were detained overnight and questioned about his whereabouts. His brother-in-law was suspended from his work, and the local police forced him to go to many different places in order to find and capture Huang. On one occasion, the local government and police station dispatched 13 teams of officers to search for him. Authorities in Jiangxi Province and local Ji'an government officials frequently went to his home to harass and threaten his family members. They ransacked his home in an attempt to locate him.

The search and surveillance were extended outside China as well. Chinese authorities also targeted me. I lived in the U.S. state of Georgia at the time. They investigated three generations of my family and their activities. They also interviewed my university classmates about my situation before and after my arrival in the U.S. Local police and national security personnel in China also started visiting Huang Xiong's family members, including his other sister and his mother, about once every three months. Xiong dared not contact his family members, so he travelled from city to city. He went to Sichuan, Guangzhou, Shanghai and finally Yunnan to distribute DVDs containing information about the persecution of Falun Gong. To avoid being arrested, he could not stay long in each place.

In the winter of 2002, Xiong started to send some of his personal items to me. He told me that he was planning to intercept TV signals to broadcast videos about Falun Gong and the persecution as a means of countering the Communist Party's spread of hate propaganda through its total control of media in China.

In April 2003, Xiong returned to Shanghai to collect the necessary equipment from an overseas practitioner. He received the equipment and was planning to return to Yunnan.

On April 19, 2003, Xiong called me from a public phone booth in Shanghai. He told me that he suspected he was being monitored and trailed by Shanghai police and that he was going to Yunnan the next day. He said he would call me again to report his whereabouts.

We have since lost all contact with him. Several months later, I made my brother's disappearance public and started calling for public attention and assistance. Our family members searched for him through the Internet, newspapers, and TV. We posted articles and messages everywhere looking for him. Our family also repeatedly called the public security office and all the police stations in Shanghai, Jiangxi Province, and Sichuan Province. However, none of these authorities took responsibility for Xiong's disappearance.

In July 2004, Chief Hu of the Yangpu District Police Station in Shanghai told an *Epoch Times* reporter that the authorities knew Xiong's situation very well, but he refused to release any information regarding his whereabouts. (This reporter is in New Zealand and she agrees to be contacted.)

On August 9, 2004, U.S. Congressman John Linder wrote to me, indicating that he had sent a letter to the U.S. Consulate in Beijing about Xiong's disappearance. The U.S. Consulate in Beijing also sent an official letter to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to request information regarding Xiong's case but did not receive a response.

In August and September 2004, U.S. Senator Zell Miller made inquiries with the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, which contacted the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to request information regarding Huang Xiong's case at least twice. The inquiry was unsuccessful.

In August 2004, our family hired a lawyer, Mr. Guo Guoting, for assistance in the case. Guo later said of his attempts to find Huang Xiong, "For my investigation, I went to visit several [government] units, and that took half a year. The relevant departments I went for investigation all treated me very

politely, but they all passed the buck. Finally, I found the director of the National Security Department of the Yangpu District Police Station in Shanghai. They all found various excuses to refuse to recognize me as his lawyer. They didn't allow me to get involved. Then, I called them several times per week, and they stalled for four or five months and refused to see me. Since we knew from a news source that this director knew the whereabouts of Huang Xiong, I later went to Tilanqiao Prison to find out his whereabouts. This is because if you disappear in Shanghai, you would be in one of two situations: you would either be doing forced labor or sentenced to prison. If you are sentenced, your information can definitely be found in Tilanqiao Prison. Your basic information can all be found there. A computer search turned out three people with his name, but none of them was him. Before my investigation was over, I was forced to suspend my business for one year and was defrauded of my lawyer's qualification certificate. So, the case remained unsettled."

A lawyer friend of mine has also confirmed through a friend who works in the Shanghai Public Security Department that Xiong was indeed abducted in 2003, but he wasn't able to find out his whereabouts or his fate.

On April 4, 2005, The Falun Gong Human Rights Working Group submitted a report to the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. In November 2005, before U.S. President George W. Bush's visit to China, I sent a letter to the President, asking for his help to find my missing brother when he met with Chinese President Hu Jintao and to demand that the Chinese authorities stop persecuting Falun Gong. The World Organization to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong (WOIPFG) has also sent a circular about its investigation into Huang Xiong's case.

In August 2011, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security launched a one-year national campaign called the "Net Cleaning Operation," which was implemented in various counties and cities in all provinces. The plan was to arrest all wanted people by mobilizing the entire police force in China. The Wan'an County Public Security Bureau in Jiangxi Province issued a notice and offered a reward of 1,000 RMB to find and arrest Huang Xiong. ([photo of the notice](#), a translation is available)

In August 2016, I submitted a criminal complaint to China's Supreme Procuratorate and Supreme Court against Jiang Zemin for ordering the persecution of Falun Gong.



Dr. Huang Wanqing

Date: September 9, 2018

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